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1. Introduction 
On July 28th, the European Commission filed an infringement procedure against its member 
state the Republic of Poland (European Commission Press Release 2017c). Poland is the first 
of its member states the EU commission has filed an infringement procedure against to 
investigate the rule of law (Pech/Steinbeis 2017). The exact subject of this procedure is the 
judiciary reform and the EU started threatening to trigger Article 7 (1) if the Polish government 
were to pursue undermining the independence of its judiciary (European Commission Press 
Release 2017b). This comes in addition to the ongoing ‘Rule of Law Dialogues’ initiated by be 
Commission in January 2016 and the three complementary ‘Rule of Law Recommendations’ 
filed in July 2016, December 2016 and July 2017 (European Commission Press Release 2017c). 
Poland however is not the only member state of the European Union that is causing the 
commission to voice concerns and take legal action: The Commission opened an infringement 
procedure against Hungary due to its asylum law in December 2015, including a follow-up in 
2017 and another one concerning Hungary’s law on foreign-funded NGOs in July 2017 
(European Commission Press Release 2017a). The Vice-President of the European 
Commission, Frans Timmermans, was asked: “How dangerous are these men [Viktor Orbán 
and Jarosław Kaczyński] to Europe, Mr. Timmermans?” during an interview with Die Zeit on 
May 4th, 2017. Timmermans argued that both countries try to undermine the rule of law in their 
respective countries in order to strengthen their own positions. These reforms are accompanied 
by strong nationalistic identities and idealistic sentiments building what Timmerman called an 
illiberal democracy. He argued that both Poland’s and Hungary’s democratic institutions are 
being simmered down to hybrid regimes between democracy and autocracy (Die Zeit 2017). 
Since the party of Victor Orbán, the FIDESZ-KDNP party1, came into power in 2010 with a 
two-thirds majority, the government started to regress the county’s judicial system and deprived 
the press of its rights to control it (Pech/Steinbeis 2017).  Orbán even proudly labelled himself 
as an illiberal democrat and recently triggered a public outcry by trying to shut down Budapest’s 
Central European University which is funded by an international NGO that champions the rule 
of law and human rights (Bremmer 2017). Today, many newspapers name both countries, 
Hungary and Poland, and the erosion of their democracies in one sentence and try to distinguish 
a pattern of autocratic behaviour. Laurent Pech, who is a Professor for European Law, further 
                                                 
1 Since 2008, both Hungarian parties FIDESZ – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Hungarian Civic Alliance) and KDNP 
– Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People’s Party) formed an electoral alliance and later a 
political party alliance. The significantly larger FIDESZ party uses the name of the much smaller party as suffix. 
In this thesis, the party will be called FIDESZ.  
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argues that Poland is taking similar steps to change the state’s institutional architecture to those 
Hungary has taken. With its judicial reforms, Poland was aiming to get control over the 
Constitutional Court in order to maximise their influence on judicial decisions. The Hungarian 
government under Victor Orbán did just that – he subjugated the constitution to party politics. 
Next to the judiciary system, the media is another institution which is being undermined, 
suppressed and controlled by Hungary and this process has already started in Poland, too. Pech 
predicts, that Poland will continue following Orbán footsteps away from democracy towards 
autocracy (Pech/Steinbeis 2017).   
This development is, however, not a local phenomenon only to be observed in Hungary and 
Poland. A decline of former democratic states is evident all over the world. After the third wave 
of democracy, which began 1974 with about 30% of states meeting the criteria of an electoral 
democracy and ended 2006 with about 60% meeting the criteria, the amount of electoral 
democracies has since declined (Diamond 2015: 140-141, 144). According to the director of 
Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Larry Diamond, since 2000, 25 democracy breakdowns 
occurred in the world not only to due coups (eight of these democracies came down due to 
military interventions, two due to other non-democratic forces) but rather through “subtle and 
incremental degradations of democratic rights and procedures that finally push a democratic 
system over the threshold into competitive authoritarianism” (Diamond 2015: 144).  
In order to assess the ‘grey zone’ between democracy and autocracy, the political scientist Prof. 
Dr. Wolfgang Merkel, together with Aurel Croissant, Peter Thiery and others, elaborated the 
concept of ‘defective democracies’ as regimes between democracy and autocracy. Defective 
democracies are sub-types of liberal democracies. Liberal democracies are defined by an 
extended democracy definition called ‘embedded democracy’. The theorists argue that liberal 
democracies, in contrast to electoral democracies2, consist of the following three dimensions: 
the dimension of vertical legitimacy, the dimension of liberal constitutionalism and rule of law 
and the dimension of effective agenda control. If at least one of this dimension cannot be fully 
guaranteed by the state, a defective democracy is in place. In compliance with the concept of 
embedded democracy, four sub-types of defective democracies can be distinguished, namely 
exclusive democracy, domain democracy, illiberal democracy and delegative democracy. 
                                                 
2 Freedom House declares electoral regimes as countries who are able to provide a) a competitive and multipolar 
system, b) universal suffrage for all adult citizens (including exceptions implemented as sanctions) c) fair elections 
that are contested on a regular basis and d) significant public access of major political parties to the electorate 
through campaigning and media. For more information see: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2012/methodology.  
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The aim of this thesis is to assess the states of democracy in Hungary and Poland, whereby 
Hungary, due to the advanced progress of approximately seven years, offers a more detailed 
assessment and categorisation of its democracy, than Poland does. This is due to the fact that 
the reforms addressing Poland’s institutional architecture were initiated by the Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość (PiS) (Law and Justice) party, which initially gained its absolute majority in 
October 2015. This reduced insight thus only allows me to formulate tendencies and thus no 
definite categorisation as defective democracy. Furthermore, I will analyse and assess the status 
quo in the respective democracies rather than the process of democratic backsliding. The 
ambition to fully scrutinise the process will go beyond the length and format of this thesis. 
Rather, this thesis will analyse structural changes at hand within the institutional landscape in 
both countries in accordance with the scheme of embedded democracies elaborated by Merkel, 
which thus grants an amplified assessment of the current states of democracy. The intention of 
this thesis is to provide an extensive and well-documented diagnosis and does not dare to 
explain neither the causes that initiated the processes nor ways to overcome the illiberal 
tendencies. Diagnosis, treatment as well as determining social, political and cultural conditions 
that triggered the system transformations are three different fields of scientific research (Kornai 
2015: 46) and cannot be subsumed under the umbrella of one thesis. Such a diagnosis is 
nevertheless crucial to fully understand the Hungarian and Polish case and helps identifying a 
certain strategy or pattern of illiberal turns within the transformation of both countries. I will 
further give a prognosis on how PiS and FIDESZ might continue with their aspiration towards 
reforming their country’s polity.   
This thesis will first introduce the theoretical background which will be based on Merkel’s 
concept of embedded democracy and the correlating sub-types of a defective democracy. Then, 
I will scrutinise whether Hungary can be described as defective democracy and determine what 
kind of defective democracy Hungary can be described as. As comparative research, I will 
scrutinise the recent developments in Poland since the elections in Poland in 2015 when the PiS 
party came into power with an absolute majority. I will conclude this thesis by categorising the 
states of democracy and distinguish a certain strategy of system transformation both countries 
pursued. Then, I will give a final prognosis on the future of Hungary’s and Poland’s democracy.  
2. Conceptual uncertainties due to an emerging ‘grey zone’ between democracy and 
autocracy 
Aurel Croissant and Peter Thiery distinguish two main questions to be discussed by researchers 
and theorists in terms of analysing and categorising the ‘grey zone’ between democracy and 
autocracy. The first question that needs to be addressed is how to conceptualise and categorise 
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the new types of hybrid regimes between democracy and autocracy, and whether the existing 
categories are already applicable to discern these regime types, or not. The second question 
asks which theories can be applied in order to demark between different regimes within the 
grey zone and between them and liberal democracies (Croissant/Thiery 2001: 10). Several 
theorists have argued either to distinguish stringently between autocracy and electoral 
democracies, thus minimising the requirements for a regime to be declared democratic (Linz 
2000), or to declare all regimes within the grey zone to hybrid regimes (Karl 1995; Rüb 2001) 
or ‘Anocraties’ (Jaggers/Gurr 1995) as unique regime type. Larry Diamond proposed to 
categorise electoral democracies either as liberal, semi-liberal or illiberal depending on scores 
measuring civil rights. Freedom House is measuring civil rights on a scale from one to seven 
whereby the higher score indicates less protection and promotion of civil rights by the state. 
According to Diamond, democracies scoring a three on this scale are semi-liberal democracies 
and regimes with a four or higher are declared illiberal democracies (Diamond 2000: 95). 
However, these approaches do not justify the heterogeneous group that assembles the ‘grey 
zone’ because they do not establish a basic concept of democracy or autocracy in order to 
sufficiently distinguish between different regimes within the grey zone as well as between them 
and democracies or autocracies. That is why this thesis will peruse the approach established by 
Wolfgang Merkel. Merkel presents an expanded definition of a liberal democracy, called 
embedded democracy based on which sub-types of defective democracies can be distinguished. 
It hast to be noted that this theory was elaborated in conjunction with Aurel Croissant and Peter 
Thiery (Merkel/Croissant 2000; Croissant/Thiery 2000; Merkel/Puhle/Croissant/Thiery et al. 
2003; Croissant 2010). 
2.1. The concept of embedded democracies 
To sufficiently investigate system transformations, a clear categorisation of different types of 
regimes ought to be established first. They need to be accurately defined in order to be 
distinguishable from each other. Only then, the verification and assessment of a system 
transformation is possible (Merkel 2010: 22). Based on this consideration, Merkel introduced 
the root concept of embedded democracies and further declared that regimes within the ‘grey 
zone’ are defective subtypes of embedded democracies (Merkel 2010: 37). Hence, democracies 
which fall short on one or more aspects of embedded democracies are not automatically 
autocracies, but rather ‘defective’ subtypes of democracies as long as they uphold the 
rudimentary and system-immanent concept of freedom, equally and control (Merkel/Puhle et 
al. 2003: 65). To accurately distinguish between multiple sub-types of democracies within the 
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grey zone and autocracies, the concept of embedded democracy formulates a basis onto which 
a clear demarcation between different types of regimes can evolve. 
An embedded democracy is a three-dimensional regime composed of five sub-regimes, which 
secure a functioning democracy. These dimensions and the respective sub-regimes only work 
as a set in consistency. These dimensions control, determine and complement each other and 
thereby create a balanced and functioning democracy. The structure of these dimensions and 
sub-regimes can be described with the following scheme:  
I. Dimension of vertical legitimacy 
1) Electoral regime 
a. Elected officials 
b. Inclusive suffrage 
c. Right to candidacy 
d. Correctly organised, free and fair elections  
2) Political rights 
e. Press freedom 
f. Freedom of association 
II. Dimensions of liberal constitutionalism and rule of law 
3) Civil rights 
g. The protection of individual liberties from violations of rights by state/ private 
agents 
h. Equality before the law 
4) Horizontal accountability  
i. Horizontal separation of powers 
III. Dimension of effective agenda control  
5) Effective power to rule 
j. Elected officials with the effective right to rule (Merkel 2004: 42) 
The dimension of vertical legitimacy 
This dimension addresses the role and the rights of the public within a democracy – it promotes 
citizen’s involvement and therefore responsive governing. The first aspect contains the most 
basic prerequisites of democracy: electoral rights. Granting every citizen the right to participate 
in regular, free, general, equal and fair elections accompanied with an open and pluralistic 
competition formulates the first pillar of a democracy. Yet of course the electoral regime is 
necessary but not sufficient to a democracy. Elections grant citizens a significant influence on 
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the political landscape yet this right is only granted every few years. Between elections, citizens 
must be able to create an “independent political sphere of action” (Merkel 2004: 38) to organise 
pluralistic public interests through political communication and organisation protected by and 
anchored in the freedom of speech, rights of association, demonstration and petition as well as 
an independent public media. This sphere of action consists of interest groups who advocate 
their preferences, opinions and demands to the government in order to achieve responsive 
governing. This dimension constitutes the ‘positive rights of freedom’, thus to participate 
democratically in numerous ways (Merkel 2004: 38-39).  
Dimensions of liberal constitutionalism and rule of law 
Civil rights are crucial to the rule of law since they protect the individual from the state and 
other private agents. The rule of law “is the principle that the state is bound to uphold its laws 
effectively and to act according to clear and defined prerogatives” (Merkel 2004: 39). 
Therefore, the rule of law protects the public from arbitrary actions by the government through 
checks and balances like the division of power, and the individual from unlawful acts infringing 
on an individual’s freedom both by the government – including the executive and legislative – 
and other individuals. Furthermore, the law ought to protect from the tyranny of the majority 
with interest groups like the opposition and minority groups being oppressed by majority 
decisions. Therefore, independent courts are inevitable for a liberal democracy. This dimension 
further includes equal access to the law and equal treatment by the law. This dimension 
formulates the ‘negative rights of freedom’ against external constraints and is, according to 
Merkel, the basic condition of citizenship (Merkel 2004: 39-40). In order for a liberal 
democracy to fully guarantee the rule of law, all three branches of a state need to be in balance 
with each other guaranteeing a division of power. Civil liberties protect the individual from 
unlawful acts by the state but not from abuse of power towards other democratic institutions. 
That is why all three branches must keep each other in check to prevent unilateral 
aggrandisement. The horizontal responsibility of powers entails a reciprocal control of 
autonomous institutions (Merkel 2004: 40-41).   
Dimension of effective agenda control  
This dimension ensures that no veto-powers like the military, oligarchs or other powerful, extra-
constitutional actors with no legitimate democratic agenda interfere with democratic 
institutions. The core concept is that only democratically elected actors hold the effective power 
to govern. Insufficiencies can occur both due to ineffective power over the military and the 
police as well as ‘reserved policy domains’ over which the state holds no effective power.    
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A liberal democracy guarantees, protects and upholds all aspects of these dimensions. They 
have to be mutually embedded in interdependency and in independence, since “[i]t is the mutual 
embeddedness of the different institutions of democracy in a network of institutional partial 
regimes that guarantees a functioning and resilient democracy” (Merkel 2004: 43). Such 
reciprocal control prevents actors from abusing their power by infringing either on the public, 
individuals, other democratic institutions or on other branches of the regime. Furthermore, this 
extended definition of liberal democracies allows a differentiated and precise scrutiny of a 
democracy with all its dimensions. Insufficiencies and malfunctions can be located to an exact 
sub-regime and thus enable researchers to formulate a precise diagnosis which is applicable to 
comparative studies amongst different democratic regimes (Merkel 2004: 43). Therefore, the 
comparative research of assessing the states of democracy in Hungary and Poland will be based 
upon this scheme of dimensions and sub-regimes. I will scrutinise Hungary’s and Poland’s 
performances in the respective sub-regimes in order to specifically locate insufficiencies and 
malfunctions within the regimes of both nations.  
2.2. Defective democracies and their sub-types 
Evolving from the scheme of dimensions and sub-regimes, Merkel, as well as Croissant and 
Thiery, elaborated the concept of ‘defective democracy’. The concept of defective democracy 
aims to close the gap of uncertainty regarding regimes in the grey zone between democracy and 
autocracy. A democracy is defective or ‘disembedded’ when at least one of the sub-regimes 
cannot be guaranteed by the regime due to insufficient institutions or institutions being 
(temporarily) undermined or misused by powerful actors (Croissant/Thiery 2001: 23). 
Defective democracies can therefore be defined as regimes with a widely functioning electoral 
system but with one or more malfunctioning or absent sub-regime(s) of liberal democracy, 
which are imperative to sufficiently ensure freedom, equality and control. Depending on which 
sub-regime is malfunctioning, a certain subtype of a defective democracy can be distinguished. 
With this concept, regimes between democracy and autocracy can be clearly demarked from 
different regimes within the grey zone and from liberal democracies. Based on the three-
dimensional democracy concept with its five respective sub-regimes, four sub-types of 
defective democracies can be established, namely an exclusive democracy, a domain 
democracy, an illiberal democracy or a delegative democracy (Merkel 2010: 37-38).  
Exclusive democracy 
With an insufficient or malfunctioning vertical dimension of legitimacy, the defective 
democracy can be described as an exclusive democracy. This is the case, if for example 
segments of the adult population were not allowed to exercise their active and passive right to 
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vote and/or elections were not regular, free, general, equal and fair (Merkel 2004: 49). This was 
the case in Switzerland until 1971 with women not being granted the right to vote. An exclusive 
democracy is also evident when civil liberties like freedom of press and freedom of association 
were to be restricted and/or the regime were to intervene within the independent political sphere 
of action and/or by manipulating the public opinion through (partially) controlled media outlets 
(Croissant/Thiery 2001: 28).  
Domain democracy 
Without extensive de facto power to govern due to veto powers like the military or oligarchs 
undermining and determining the nation’s politics, the regime is to be called a domain 
democracy. One can speak of a domain democracy even if only parts of the regime are not 
under the full control of elected democrats and in balance with the rule of law but under the 
control of such veto-powers. The most common type of domain democracies are military 
regimes which occurred most commonly in Latin America, Africa and Asia in the 70s and 80s 
(Merkel/Puhle et al. 2003: 249-250). The establishment of such domains takes places either 
through non-constitutional (Paraguay) or constitutional means (Chile) (Croissant/Thiery 2001: 
28). 
Illiberal democracy 
An illiberal democracy can reveal one to three of the following characteristics: First, the regime 
cannot sufficiently and comprehensively enforce civil liberties and constitutional human rights. 
This entails restricted participation rights and a malfunctioning or absent independent political 
sphere of action. Freedom of press, freedom of speech and freedom of association are not 
guaranteed to a sufficient extent by the state. Second, a malfunctioning judiciary fails to 
guarantee access to and equality before the law, the judiciary’s control over the executive and 
legislative branches is weak and constitutional norms are not being followed by the government. 
Third, the state’s politics’ and bureaucracy’s efficiency, accountability and transparency are 
jeopardised by corruption. Violated civil rights, a weak judiciary or a corrupted regime lead to 
an erosion of the country’s rule of law and undermine the public’s trust in the regime and its 
institutions in a severe way (Merkel/Puhle et al. 2003: 262-263). According to Merkel, this is 
the most common type of defective democracy and it can be examined worldwide (Merkel 
2004: 49).  
Delegative democracy 
The absence of the division of power is central to a delegative democracy. Due to an executive 
aggrandisement, the legislative and the judicative are weakened and do not possess significant 
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influence on the executive and the system of checks and balances is dismantled. This is the case 
for example, if the government (or president) were to overrule the parliament and/or intervene 
with the judiciary in order to pursue its own agenda with an (presidential) executive 
aggrandisement. Such an aggrandisement tends to be pursued by charismatic leaders within a 
democratic system. Delegative democracies most commonly occur in presidential democratic 
systems. An illiberal democracy can evolve into a delegative democracy. Overall, regimes in 
the grey zone tend to be amalgams of two or all four of them (Merkel 2004: 49-50).  
In conclusion, the general rule of classification is the following: In an exclusive democracy, the 
defects predominantly occur in sub-regime one (electoral regime) and two (political rights). In 
an illiberal democracy, the defects predominantly occur in sub-regime three (civil rights) and 
in a delegative democracy, the defects mostly occur in sub-regime four (horizontal 
accountability). Defects in sub-regime five (effective power to rule) result in a domain 
democracy (Merkel 2004: 172-173).  Nevertheless, the line between autocracies and severely 
defective democracies can be quite thin, though the main demarcation between severely 
defective democracies and autocracies is that, whilst severely defective democracies do violate 
several aspects of an embedded democracy, they uphold the principle of democratic elections 
– even if only to some extend as with exclusive democracies, whereas autocracies supress 
democratic interactions and thereby suspend the concept of democratic elections (Merkel 2010: 
23). 
3. Assessing the states of democracy in Hungary and Poland 
The assessment of the states of democracy in Hungary and Poland will base upon the scheme 
elaborated by Merkel, Thiery, Croissant et al. as described in chapter two. In this chapter, I will 
investigate Hungary’s and Poland’s performances within the sub-regimes of an embedded 
democracy. Based on the research, I will argue whether and what type of defective 
democracy(ies) are to be distinguished. Since this qualitative empirical research will ground on 
the theory background established above, the method is deductive. 
3.1. Research method and case selection 
The applied research strategy is comparative and uses the approach of the Most-Similar-
Systems Design (MSSD). Both countries demonstrate similar crucial basic parameters: Both 
are members in the European Union, both acceded in 2004 as part of the eastern EU 
enlargement. Both are post-socialist countries and have detached themselves from communism: 
Poland established the Third Republic and implemented a new constitution in 1989 (CIA 
Factbook 2017b) whilst in 1989 the Third Hungarian Republic was declared, the constitution 
 
 
10 
 
rewritten and the first elections were held in 1990 (CIA Factbook 2017a). Hence, both 
democratic and capitalistic regimes were established as parliamentary constitutional republics 
within a similar time-frame. Furthermore, both countries have similar economic performances. 
The GDPs per capita (PPP) is in Hungary 27,200$ and in Poland 27,700$. The GINI indices3 
describing the distribution of family incomes amongst the population are also quite alike: 
Hungary: 28,2 (country in comparison to the world: 133) and Poland 30,8 (country in 
comparison to the world: 120) (CIA Factbook 2017a/b). Furthermore, both governing parties, 
PiS and FIDESZ, demonstrate several similarities in terms of ideology and normative 
alignments and more accurately, an ideology-driven willingness for an institutional change, a 
specific view on legitimacy and the aim of a sovereignty centric strengthening of the state (Lang 
2016: 75). These similarities are more significant to this thesis since the performances of both 
parties as governmental powers are being compared. Both want to consolidate their countries 
in the spirit of a neo-traditionalist modernisation and they affiliate themselves with a 
transformative agenda derived from a democratic majority mandate. Additionally, they are 
striving for an extensive and effective marking of national sovereignty within the EU. PiS and 
FIDESZ anchor the aberration of their countries in the opaque transformation process from 
communism to a new order in which ex-communist insiders, oligarchs, and liberal-
cosmopolitan elites implanted themselves into the state, the administration, the financial world 
and large companies, as well as into the most important media and cultural institutions, resulting 
in a dysfunctional regime (Bielik-Robson 2017: 90-91; Fehr 2016: 81-82; Koenen 2015: 40-
41). Both parties promote a similar understanding of executive governance: Democracy is to be 
seen as rule of the majority and the division of powers merely as contradiction to the mission 
received by the electorate. Members of PiS regard FIDESZ party-leader Orbán as role-model 
and the FIDESZ government is being openly adored. Thus, all eyes looked attentively to 
Hungary (Lang 2016: 61-63, 75; Vetter 2017b: 67). Party affiliates often refer to Hungary as 
one of Poland’s closest allies within the EU. After PiS lost the parliamentary elections in 2011, 
the party leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, declared that he is “deeply convinced that the day will 
come when we will have Budapest in Warsaw” (Chapman 2017: 15).  
                                                 
3 The GINI index measures the equal distribution of a country’s income with a scale ranging from 0 to 100. High 
numbers indicate a more unequal distribution of income whereas low numbers indicate a more equal distribution 
of wealth. The CIA World Factbook ranks 140 countries in accordance with their scores ranged from low (high 
inequality) to high (low inequality). For more information see: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html. 
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In recent history, both Hungary and Poland have been certified as embedded democracies. 
Hungary and Poland (along with Slovenia and the Czech Republic) were perceived as post-
communist success stories and were both considered as fully consolidated democracies 
(Herman 2016: 252; Merkel 2004: 143, 147, 161). However, with FIDESZ’ victory in 2010, 
Hungary was the first post-communist country in East-Central Europe to make an illiberal U-
turn away from democracy (Kornai 2015: 34; Herman 2016: 258), and was followed by Poland 
(Vetter 2017b: 67).  
The method of Most-Similar-Systems-Design attempts to investigate whether in two or more 
cases with similar independent variables – the effect-producing variables (X) lead to observed 
outcomes (Y) or not (Caramani 2011: 57).  The independent variables (X) are the two governing 
parties PiS and FIDESZ who both have congruent normative sentiments and world views whilst 
both diagnose their countries with similar, distinct dysfunctions. Both advocate a similar 
solution process and hence are aiming to address this dysfunction with similar approaches. The 
dependent variable (Y) is the outcome produced by governing parties FRIDEZ and PiS, which 
are the states of democracy in accordance to Merkel’s theory. The question to be answered is 
whether both governing parties have led their countries down a similar path towards defective 
democracy.  
Based on the scheme elaborated by Merkel, I can now analyse possible shortcomings, violations 
or malfunctions within the five sub-regimes in Hungary’s and Poland’s democracy. Yet, since 
the starting points of the analysis are quite different – Victor Orbán’s FIDESZ party came into 
power with a two-thirds majority in 2010 and Jarosław Kaczyński’s PiS party gained its 
absolute majority in 2015 – I will be able to investigate Hungary’s ‘illiberal turn’ more detailed 
and accurately than Poland’s. A definite categorisation as defective democracy may only be in 
order for Hungary. Therefore, I will first examine Hungary’s performances within different sub-
regimes and then investigate whether Poland shows congruous changes within its institutional 
architecture. 
Subjects to these debates will be the changes within the institutional architecture of both states 
and therefore the polity and not the policy results, since policy outputs are not defining 
characteristics of the democracy-concept this thesis is based upon (Merkel 2004: 36). Neither 
will the countries’ economies be objects of investigation. Legislation, which had been formally 
implemented but was then revoked due to criticism from either the EU, the respective 
Constitutional Courts or due to public protests will not be considered either. The analytical 
subjects will be acquired from legislative and judicative decisions, declarations by the 
governments as well as press releases together with official reports issued by the European- and 
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Venice Commission. Moreover, I will examine country reports issued by several think tanks 
and foundations like the opinions and recommendations published by the OSCE, the Nations 
in Transit Country Reports (NiT) and the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI). 
Since 1999, this index analyses strategies and results of political transformation processes in 
129 countries. The assessments are based upon Merkel’s concept of embedded democracy and 
he himself was one of the founding scientists of this project, together with Aurel Croissant and 
Peter Thiery. These evaluations of different polity-fields conclude with a rating between one 
and ten with ten representing a well-embedded polity (Mohr 2016). Since this index is based 
upon Merkel’s concept of embedded democracy, its evaluation of the current state of Hungary’s 
democracy is highly valuable to this thesis. However, the latest BTI assessment of Poland does 
not include the polity changes under the PIS-government and therefore can only be used as 
reference material regarding the state of democracy under the previous government. In addition 
to the subjects that have already been mentioned, the chronic of events provided by Polen-
Analysen as well as the issue 66 (1-2) of the Osteuropa magazine, which was dedicated to the 
‘conservative revolution’ in Poland, will be central for the assessment of Poland’s democracy. 
Nevertheless, it has to be clarified that the assessment of both Hungary’s and Poland’s state of 
democracy will base upon official and public acts by the governments as facts, which are not 
subjects to debates questioning their existence.  
3.2. Changes regarding the electoral regime in Hungary 
The dimension of vertical legitimacy includes a functioning electoral regime guaranteeing 
elected officials, inclusive suffrage, right to candidacy and correctly organised and fair elections 
(see chapter 2.1.). In 2010, FIDESZ reached a qualified majority (a qualified majority will in 
this thesis constitute a two-thirds majority) of parliament and had been able to continue on this 
path by defending its qualified majority of parliament in the election in 2014. However, in 2015, 
the party lost two seats and thereby its qualified majority (Hegedüs 2017: 5). With their newly 
gained majority of parliament in 2010, FIDESZ introduced a myriad of reforms to the state’s 
democratic architecture, amongst them several reforms concerning the electoral regime. Right 
in the beginning of their first legislative term, the party passed the ‘Law on Elections of 
Members of Parliament’ (Act CCIII), which was amended four times between 2011 and 2013 
and was supplemented with the ‘Law on Election Procedures’ (Act XXXVI) in 2013, which 
itself was amended three times. Both legislations are cardinal acts and require a two-thirds 
majority to be changed or withdrawn. The reforms adjusted the electoral regime in the following 
ways: Within the majoritarian, unicameral election system, voters elect direct candidates in 
single-seat constituencies as well as party lists in a multi-seat constituency within the 
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proportional electoral system. Previous to the reforms, a second poll was needed if the 
compulsory absolute majority in single-seated constituencies had not been reached or the 
necessary turn-out of 50% had not been accomplished in the first round (Renwick 2012: 4-5). 
The absence of a second poll weakened the opposition by withdrawing the possibility of an 
opponent proposed by a multi-partisan opposition after the first round (BTI 2016a: 6). Further 
changes included the reduction of seats in parliament from 386 to 199 (CCIII, §3 (1)). Many 
experts considered this change valid since with a population of just ten million the parliament 
was considered oversized. Even several opposition parties argued in favour of this reform 
(Renwick 2012: 8-10). Nevertheless, this change does intensify the negative effect of other 
reforms: The ratio between single-member constituencies and national lists was shifted in 
favour of the first. The mandates allocated through single-member constituencies used to 
compose 46% of all mandates in comparison to 53% after the reforms (CCIII, §3 (2)). The 
mandates for single-member consistencies used to emerge from surplus votes, that used to be 
defined as votes of defeated candidates – today surplus votes are all votes allocated from 
defeated candidates as well as votes of successful candidates that go beyond the necessary 
minimum number of votes (CCIII, §15, 16). These enormous overcompensations favour the 
winning party and increase the disproportion of the Hungarian electoral system (Bozóki 2011: 
77, 80-81; Tóka 2014: 315). In combination with a downscaled parliament, this effect increases 
even further. In 2010, 53,1% of votes (172 of 176 direct mandates, 90 of 210 mandates through 
the regional and national party-list) for FIDESZ translated into 68,1% of seats (total: 262) and 
therefore into a three-third majority (National Election Office 2010). Whereas in 2014, the 
FIDESZ party only acquired 96 out of 106 single-member constituencies and 37 out of 93 
mandates via national list and therefore only 44,9% of all votes and 133 [131 in 2015] seats 
respectively (National Election Office 2014) whilst FIDESZ acquired six mandates only due to 
the re-written definition of surplus votes (BTI 2016a: 7; Tóka 2014: 319-320). Therefore, 
significantly less votes were necessary to gain a three-thirds majority. The shift of the weighting 
of the votes to the benefit of the governing party is illustrated in the following figure: 
Parliamentary 
Election 
FIDESZ voters as a share of… FIDESZ’ share of 
parliamentary seats All people entitled to vote All voters 
2010 41,5% 53,1% 68,1% 
2014 26,6% 44,9% 66,8% 
 
 
Figure one: Comparison of election results of 2010 and 2014 parliamentary elections in 
Hungary (Kornai 2015: 42).  
 
 
14 
 
These implicit advantages were accompanied by several explicit ones: CCIII §4 (1-9) 
introduced ‘gerrymandering’ by rearranging electoral constituencies to the effect that areas 
favouring opposition parties were enlarged, thereby reducing the actual influence of votes 
within these areas. The size of five out of 106 constituencies varied to an extend of over 15% 
in comparison to the national average thus undermining the principle of equal votes as declared 
in Act CCIII (BTI 2016a: 6; CCIII §4 (4)). Furthermore, an exact procedure for calculating the 
constituency boundaries was not specified and thus ignored the necessity of an independent 
commission drawing the lines as demanded by the Venice Commission (OSCE 2014: 7). The 
evident lack of transparency becomes even more significant since this law, amongst many 
others, was declared a ‘cardinal law’ and therefore requires a two-thirds majority to be changed 
(OSCE 2014: 8). Renwick declares that none of these reforms were in line with public interest 
yet they all favoured the interests of the governing party. The existing majority rule, which 
already favoured bigger parties, was expanded even further whilst the government was not able 
to explain the need of an expanded majority principle (Renwick 2012: 15-16), thereby widening 
rather than counterbalancing the distance between governing and opposition parties. Although 
the downsizing of parliament was a very popular decision, the current electoral system distorts 
the expression of the popular vote and thereby triggers cynicism towards democratic institutions 
and, according to Tóka, perceived political legitimacy will diminish (Tóka 2014: 321).  
In accordance to Merkel’s scheme of embedded democracy, the electoral regime has to be free 
and fair. The fairness of this system can be questioned since there is a clear bias towards the 
governing party due to electoral reforms in 2010 and 2013. As to the question whether the 
electoral regime guarantees that only elected officials hold power, no violations can be found 
since all members of parliament gained their position based on election results. Yet the aspect 
of inclusive suffrage deserves a closer look. On the one hand, the reforms increased the number 
of possible voters by including foreign ethnic Hungarians and the access to Hungarian 
citizenship was eased (CCIII §12 (3)).  However, it can be argued that this reform was based 
on political interest, due to the fact that in 2014, Hungarians from abroad voted with 95,5% in 
favour of FIDESZ. Yet, on the other hand, non-Hungarian voters with permanent residency 
were only able to vote personally at diplomatic missions (BTI 2016a: 7). Furthermore, 
according to the OSCE Election Observer Report, the government deprived 57,000 citizens 
with mental disabilities and 38,000 prisoners, some 26,000 of them had completed their 
sentences, of their right to vote, thereby breaching the 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (OSCE 2014: 5). 
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These reforms led the OSCE to confirm that the restrictive campaign regulations, together with 
biased media coverage (see chapter 3.3.) and an opaque differentiation between political parties 
and the state in media (see chapter 3.3.), the main governing party benefitted from an undue 
advantage. The OSCE concluded that “a number of key amendments negatively affected the 
electoral process, including the removal of important checks and balances” (OSCE 2014: 1). 
The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) declared that the “governing political 
parties, Fidesz-KDNP, won all three elections [parliamentary, European Parliament and 
subnational elections] [in 2014] by tweaking electoral rules to their benefit and misusing state 
resources. The reforms increased the disproportionality of the electoral system.” (BTI 2016a: 
6). In conclusion, the electoral regime does not fulfil all requirements necessary to the first sub-
regime of an embedded democracy. Whilst elected officials do hold the mandate of power 
within the parliament, the parliament consists of elected officials and all Hungarian citizens do 
have the right to candidacy, the other aspects to the sub-regime do display several malfunctions 
and shortcomings. The inclusive suffrage is not guaranteed due to (former) prisoners and people 
with mental illnesses being excluded from voting. The reforms between 2011 and 2013 to the 
election procedure are detrimental to fair elections as a consequence of numerous changes 
favouring either big parties in general or the governing party itself. The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
Transformation Index rates the electoral regime with 7.  Of course, the malfunctions of the 
electoral regime do correlate with reforms concerning political rights and therefore a final 
evaluation of the first dimension of vertical legitimacy can only be given in conjunction with 
changes regarding political rights.  
3.2.1. Outlook: Changes regarding the electoral regime in Poland 
In 2015, the populist Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) party won both 
parliamentary elections and the presidential election. In May 2015, the PiS MEP Andrzej Duda 
won the Presidency in two electoral rounds. The Polish bicameralism legislation consists of the 
national assembly (Sejm) as lower house and the Senate as upper house and in October 2015, 
with 37% of all votes, PiS achieved a slight absolute majority in the Sejm and a clear absolute 
majority in the Senate. Thereby PiS controls the executive and the legislative, yet a required 
qualified majority to change the constitution was clearly missed. Nevertheless, the presidency 
and an absolute majority in both chambers held by one party is a precedential case in democratic 
Poland. Andrzej Duda as President of the Republic and Beata Szydło as Prime Minister 
officially hold power, yet it is no secret that PiS party-leader and former Prime Minister (2006-
2007) Jarosław Kaczyński, who does not hold an official office, controls both the President and 
the Prime Minister and is the real leader in Polish politics (Arak/Bobiński 2017: 4; Vetter 2016: 
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33-34; Łazowski 2016: 1). PiS came into power before by winning the elections in 2005 with 
Jarosław Kaczyński as Prime Minister and his twin brother Lech Kaczyński as President. This 
period of time will however not be considered in the current assessment of Polish democracy.  
Kaczyński as informal Head of State is not controlled by the division of power yet influences 
both the legislative and executive as a ‘power behind the throne’, constitutes a first breach to 
Merkels concept of an embedded electoral system. His power is not legitimised by a mandate 
given through democratic elections, yet he is the de facto leader in Polish politics and is also 
perceived as such: 65% of Poles view him as Poland’s effective ruler whereas only 14% view 
Duda and 18% view Szydło as such (Arak/Bobiński 2017: 4). Hence, the elected officials do 
not hold sufficient power due to an informal Head of State.  
The current government has so far not changed the electoral regime. According to the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2016 report on Poland, there haven’t been 
any notable violations on free and fair elections since 1990. Furthermore, there are no 
constraints on inclusive suffrage and on the right to candidacy. The BTI rates Poland’s election 
regime with 10 (BTI 2016b: 6). However, the Nations in Transit Report did observe PiS’ 
research on possible election reforms which would deny independent single-candidates to run 
in single-member districts and would empower the party-leader to decide on the candidacies’ 
order on party lists. The opposition denounced these reform plans since they would foster a 
wide-ranging gerrymandering favouring the ruling party (Arak/Bobiński 2017: 5). Since they 
are not in place yet, the electoral regime is only slightly damaged due to an informal Head of 
State holding power.  
3.3. Changes regarding political rights in Hungary 
Political rights include the freedom of press, freedom of speech and an intact, independent 
political sphere of action (see chapter 2.1.) and strongly correlate with the electoral regime. 
First, I will scrutinise the freedom of press and media, then the freedom of speech and 
association to conclude whether an independent political sphere of action is present. The re-
written Hungarian constitution of 2011 including all four amendments is crucial not only to this 
analysis, but to the analysis of all sub-regimes. This analysis will further regard two media laws 
– ‘Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules of Media Content’ 
and ‘Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Communication’.  
The new constitution protects the freedom of opinion, thought and conscience (Art. VII (1)), 
the freedom of association and assembly, to join trade unions (Article VIII (1-5)) as well as 
freedom of expression and press (Art. IX (1-3)). Human dignity shall not be harmed through 
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freedom of expression (Art. IX (4)). However, the constitution provides significant limitations 
to some of these principles. First, the freedom of expression shall not be exercised “with the 
aim of violating the dignity of the Hungarian nation” and persons inflicted by such violence 
may enforce their claims in court (Art. IX (5)). This vaguely written prohibition against hate 
speech towards the Hungarian nations would, according to the Venice Commission, enable 
authorities to widely apply this prohibition and therefore protect Hungarian institutions and 
office holders from criticism, thereby limiting freedom of speech (Venice Commission 2013: 
14). Similar blurred restrictions can be found in the “Act CIV on Freedom of Press and 
Fundamental Rules of Media Content” which limits the freedom of press to an extent that the 
exercising of this freedom shall “not constitute or encourage any acts of crime, violate public 
morals or the moral rights of others” (CIV Art. 4 (3)) whilst demanding linear media services 
to provide a balanced coverage to ensure proportionality and democratic public opinion (CIV 
Art. 13). These vague verbalisations caused the Council of Europe to criticise that these 
requirements “pose the risk […] of granting excessive discretion to authorities to punish 
information providers who give particular relevance or coverage to issues that are not in line 
with the majority political mainstream” (Council of Europe Experts 2012: 16). These opaque 
and extensive restrictions lead to self-censorship of media outlets in order to avoid fines and/or 
prosecution (Küpper 2012a: 16; Kornai 2015: 40). In order to supervise the private and public 
media services, press products and the communication market and to ensure ‘balanced’ 
coverage, the constitution established the “National Media and Info-communications 
Authority” (Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság, NMHH) as cardinal law (Art. IX (6), 
CLXXXV Art. 109-110A)). The law provides the body with almost unlimited power: The 
NMHH allocates radio- and television frequencies, decides on mandates and cost efficiency of 
public media services and their programs. They further supervise the ownership on print media 
and the extent of freedom of speech in these outlets (CLXXXV Art. 109-110; Vásárhelyi 2011: 
162). The NMHH includes the “Media Council of the National Media and Info-communications 
Authority” (CLXXXV Art. 109 (4)). The members of this Council (the president and four 
members) are appointed by a majority of parliament and their terms last nine years. The 
President of the National Media and Info-communications Authority is automatically 
nominated for President of the Media Council by the President of Hungary (CLXXXV Art. 124 
(1)). The President’s term lasts nine years, hence two legislation periods, and thereby anchors 
the influence of FIDESZ on media for many years to come (Vásárhelyi 2011: 161). The Council 
can repeal the protection of information and editorial secrets via decree – which is further 
increasing the vulnerability to power abuse. Furthermore, they are entitled to impose heavy 
fines on non-compliant outlets, which further strengthen the effect of self-censorship 
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(Vásárhelyi 2011: 162; Council of Europe 2012: 40-42). The Media Council even has police 
powers and can for example issue search warrants and confiscate materials. Vásárhelyi argues 
that the governing party centralised all aspects of public media outlets to achieve an all-
embracing monopoly on decision making regarding public media. In one and a half years, the 
governing party achieved a complete occupation on all public media outlets, which were 
dilapidated to propagandistic mouthpieces to the governing party (Vásárhelyi 2011: 162-163, 
165). Reporters Without Borders strongly condemns this media legislation by arguing that the 
media law deprived Hungarians of their fundamental and legitimate freedom to receive and 
impart news and information. The concept of a correct news balance is so vaguely defined that 
a biased misuse of the mandate is almost certain (Reporters Without Borders 2011). Vetter 
developed a similar diagnose: These vaguely defined premises enable the institutions to 
interfere with media outlets and sanction them with existence-threatening fines, if the 
institutions were under the impression that distinctive media outlets harmed the government or 
FIDESZ in any way (Vetter 2017b: 76).  
This dilapidation includes private media as well. The Hungarian constitution restricts political 
campaign advertisements to only be published by private media outlets free of charge to 
guarantee equal opportunities to all political parties, which was laid down as cardinal act (Art. 
IX (3)). Yet what at first seems to be an equalisation of party advertisement in media outlets, 
one can identify an unfair advantage for the FIDESZ party: Party-affiliated businesses 
expanded their ownership of private media-outlets by purchasing the popular TV2 channel and 
thereby causing unbalanced, pro-government media and collective mouthpieces for the 
government and especially the governing party (Kornai 2015: 40; Vásárhelyi 2011: 164; 
European Commission Press Release 2016). In October 2016, the oligarch Lörinc Mészáros, 
who is the mayor of Orbán’s hometown, successfully bought Mediaworks, a company that owns 
several newspapers and publishes eight regional papers and is thus as key player in the 
Hungarian media market, with his company Opimus Press (Hegedüs 2017: 7). The ties between 
the major and the FIDESZ leadership, especially Orbán, are close (Hegedüs 2017:7; Koenen 
2015: 34). The mayor for example perpetually profits in auctions of land organised by the state 
and he once received a football stadium from Orbán as a gift (Koenen 2015:34). Also in October 
2016, the leading leftist newspaper Népszabadság, which is owed by Mediaworks, was closed 
down. According to Mediaworks, the shut-down was due to financial reasons, yet just shortly 
before the shut-down the newspaper published several articles and investigations on corruption 
schemes involving several of Orbán’s close political allies (Hegedüs 2017:7; Reporters Without 
Borders 2017a). According to Human Rights Watch, this incident constitutes another segment 
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in the history of contempt for media freedom (Gall 2016). In conclusion, the requirement that 
private media outlets shall only publish political campaign advertisements free of charge 
favours FIDESZ since it controls most of the private media outlets. The party has established 
itself a large media platform through which it has the influence on running its advertisements 
for free, whilst denying opposition parties just that. Therefore, Reporters Without Borders 
(RWB) declared this act politically motivated. With Opimus Press dominating over 50% of the 
market, FIDESZ controls a dozen newspapers and other, private media outlets and the 
“rapacious appetite” of the ruling party seems unlimited (Reporters Without Borders 2017a). 
The European Commission initiated investigation procedures against this law, which led 
Hungary to introduce an amendment to it. Yet the European Commission still requires Hungary 
“to remove the unjustified discrimination between companies under the 2014 Advertisement 
Tax Act and/or the amended version and restore equal treatment in the market” (European 
Commission Press Release 2016). 
The Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) scrutinized media pluralism in 
Hungary by measuring four types of risks to media pluralism – basic protection, market 
plurality, political independence and social inclusiveness. The research confirmed the political 
control over media outlets and with that, the lack of political independence causes the highest 
risk to Hungarian media pluralism (medium risk: basic protection, market plurality and social 
inclusiveness)4 (CMPF 2016: 1). Concerning political independence, the report concludes that 
the private media sector is dominated by oligarchs with close ties to the government, causing 
media outlets to actively promote the governmental line. The public media service (PMS) 
featured output heavily biased towards the government and thereby dramatically reduced media 
pluralism and the diversity of news available to the public (CMPF 2016: 11). A figure that 
further illustrates the consequences the Constitution and the New Media Laws have had on 
media pluralism is displayed in the annex as figure two.  
To summarise, the Authority (NMHH) and its Media Council, as well as political parties and 
politicians imposed numerus limitations and restrictions onto the media landscape. Their 
influence results in biased media outlets which concludes in unfair advantages for the leading 
political parties during election campaigns. Due to guidelines and strong state regulations 
demanding balanced coverage, thereby protecting Hungarian institutions and office holders 
                                                 
4 The results for each area and indicator are presented on a scale from 0% to 100%. Scores between 67 and 100% 
are high risk, 34 to 66% are medium risk, while those between 0 and 33% are considered low risk. In order to 
avoid an assessment of total absence or certainty of risk, scores of 0 were rated 3% and scores of 100 were rated 
97% by default. For more information see: http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/. 
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from criticism as illustrated above, the editorial autonomy is heavily restricted as is the PMS 
independence from governance and funding (CMPF 2016: 8-9). The World Press Freedom 
Index illustrates the downward trend in press freedom in Hungary since FIDESZ took office in 
2010. The Index gets published every year by Reporters Without Borders and illustrates the 
freedom of press worldwide. The score5 evaluates the level of freedom of press with 0 being 
the best and 100 being the worst possible outcome and thus determines the ranking of scores of 
180 countries. In Hungary, the freedom of press perpetually worsened (Reporters Without 
Borders 2017b): 
 2009 2010 2011/12 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Score 5.50 7.50 10.00 26.09 26.73 27.44 28.17 29.01 
Ranking 25 23 40 56 64 65 67 71 
 
 
Merkel declared freedom of press as fundamental to the dimension of vertical legitimacy. 
Considering the illustrated research, one can only conclude that this pillar of vertical legitimacy 
is damaged both in view of the electoral regime as of press freedom. To extensively assess 
political rights in Hungary I will now examine the freedom of association.  
The constitution protects and guarantees the right to peaceful assemble and to form 
organisations, political parties and trade unions (Art. VIII (1-5)). However, the executive is 
perpetually increasing the influence of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) by withdrawing financial support and by dominating 
leading positions within these institutions with its own supporters (BTI 2016a: 7). NGOs and 
‘political enemies’ face constant smear campaigns and the governmental rhetoric towards 
NGOs has become increasingly intimidating (Hegedüs 2017: 6-7).  The main allegation pursued 
by the government is labelling NGOs as advocates of foreign interests and organisations. 
Members linked to the ‘EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund’ were subjects to criminal procedures 
since the Norwegian Fund allegedly supported Hungarian opposition parties. NGOs distributing 
the fund and organisations supported by the NGO Fund ceased to exist or were terminated (The 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2017: 1). The Ökotárs Foundation and DemNet, both managing 
the Norwegian Fund, were suspects of police investigations and raids (Herman 2016: 259; BTI 
                                                 
5 The indicators that were used to determine the ratings are: pluralism, media independence, environment and self-
censorship, legislative framework, transparency, infrastructure and abuses. For more information see: 
https://rsf.org/en/detailed-methodology. 
Figure three: World Press Freedom Index Hungary – Scores and Ranking 2009 – 2017 
(Reporters Without Borders 2017b) 
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2016a: 8). In 2017, the ‘Law on the Transparency of Organisations Receiving Support from 
Abroad’ was under scrutiny of the European Commission. The Hungarian law on foreign-
funded NGOs established new prerequisites on NGOs receiving more than 24,000€ on foreign 
funds, demanding them to register and labelling themselves as organisations supported from 
abroad and to report information regarding funding and donors from abroad to the authorises. 
If NGOs failed to comply, sanctions would have to be faced. According to the Commission, the 
right to freedom of association and the rights to protection of private life and of personal data 
are being violated and disproportionate restrictions to the free movement of capital have been 
implemented. In the opinion of the Venice Commission, this legislation “will cause a 
disproportionate and unnecessary interference with the freedoms of association and expression, 
the right to privacy, and the prohibition of discrimination” (Venice Commission 2017: 17). 
Despite a preliminary opinion on the draft by the Venice Commission, the Hungarian 
Parliament passed an amended version which, however, did not address all of the Venice 
Commission’s recommendations (International Justice Resource Center 2017) causing the 
European Commission to implement an infringement procedure on the same day (European 
Commission Press Release 2017d). Amnesty International calls this law a “vicious and 
calculated assault on civil society”, further arguing that “[a]ttempts to disguise this law as being 
necessary to protect national security cannot hide its real purpose: to stigmatize, discredit and 
intimidate critical NGOs and hamper their vital work” (Amnesty International 2017a). Several 
institutions and NGOs like Reporters Without Borders, Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch and others issued a letter to the Members of the European Parliament demanding them 
to adopt a resolution on the situation in Hungary. They highlight the stigmatization and 
obstruction of the work of NGOs and the civil society by intimidating and discrediting civil 
society groups. This law would merely be an instrument to silence Hungarian NGOs since this 
probation limits the space for independent organisations, which is only worsening the already 
weakened state of checks and balances. The letter declares that “the severity of the current 
situation and the breadth of the measures recently introduced […] add to an already grim picture 
where democratic checks and balances have been severely undermined and the rule of law is 
under serious threat” (Majerczak/Raemdonck/Guibert/ McGowan/Kazatchkine/Dam 2017). 
Another aspect on the government’s increasing influence on the political sphere is an 
amendment to the constitution granting the parliament the power to recognise certain religious 
communities as churches with entailed benefits, without determining criteria guiding this 
procedure (Constitution Art. VII (4)). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) declared 
this law illegal since it violated freedom of religion and freedom of association by making the 
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status of religious groups depended on parliamentary decision (ECtHR 2014: 31). This ruling 
however has so far been ignored by the Hungarian Government (Forum for Religious Freedom 
2016: 1). 
To summarise, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformations Index rates association and 
assembly rights with 7 and the freedom of expression with 6. Therefore, the analysis revealed 
violations both in view of the electoral regime and press freedom but also in view of freedom 
of association. Having finalised the assessment of the dimension of vertical legitimacy, one can 
conclude both sub-regimes do display several defects. The leading party used numerous tools 
to twist the legislation to its favour – not only granting them an unfair advantage in the election 
procedure due to the election reforms but also due to an immense influence on media outputs. 
Thus, the elections are consequently fairly free, yet not fair. Furthermore, critical voices of 
individuals, groups and associations (CSOs, NGOs and religious groups) are being restricted 
and interfered with to an alarming extend.  
3.3.1. Outlook: Changes regarding political rights in Poland 
Shortly after the election in 2015, the majority of parliament passed a bill which de facto 
paralysed the Constitutional Court (see chapter 3.5.1.). With this blockade installed, the 
governing party was able to initiate several reforms that would normally have been stopped by 
the Constitutional Court: In December 2015, the Sejm passed the ‘Act of 30 December 2015 
amending the Broadcasting Act’ as so called ‘small media law package’. The Act deprived the 
constitutionally embedded ‘National Broadcasting Council’ (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii I 
Telewizji, KRRiT) of its power by granting the Minister of Treasury core competences 
previously held by the KRRiT. The KRRiT was established in 1992 and had the competence to 
appoint the Directors of public media outlets TVP (Polish TV) and PR (Polish Radio) as well 
as supervising the fulfilment of the information- culture- and education mandate of public 
media outlets. With the amendment, the Minister of Treasury has the mandate to appoint the 
members and directors of the Board of Managements in public media outlets (Art. 1 (2b)) as 
well as the members and directors of the Supervisory Boards of public media outlets (Art. 1 
(3c)). Furthermore, regional branches will be managed by directors appointed by the Board of 
Management and due to the amendments, the consent of the KRRiT is no longer required (Art. 
1 (5)). The former members of the Management and Supervisory Boards were laid off (Art. 2). 
The OSCE media freedom representative Dunja Mijatović voiced strong concerns regarding 
this Act, arguing that “[i]t is vital that public service broadcasters are guarded against any 
attempts of political or commercial influence. I fear the hastily introduced changes will 
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endanger the basic conditions of independence, objectivity and impartiality of public service 
broadcasters.” (OSCE/Mijatović 2015). 
The small media package law was however just an interim solution and was to be superseded 
by the so called ‘big media law package’ in April 2016, which had been introduced to the 
parliament in April 2016. The draft bill included an extensive revision of regulation on public 
media outlets (Polish TV - TVP, Polish Radio - PR and Polish Press Agency - PAP), television 
fees and the financing of public media services. Yet, according to the Polish Press Agency, the 
Polish Culture Minister Czabanski said that the implementation of the big media law must be 
postponed since such extensive changes require not only the notification of the EU but the 
remarks by the Council of the European Union shall be included as well, which takes time (PAP 
2016).  
That is why a ‘bridge media law package’ on the ‘Council on National Media’ has been 
introduced in June 2016, as the only element of the ‘big media law package’ that came into 
force so far. The ‘Act of 22 June 2016 on the Council on National Media’ was passed by the 
Senate on July 24th without adjustments. This bridging law implemented the Council on 
National Media (Rada Mediów Narodowych, RMN) which replaced the above-mentioned tasks 
of the Minister of Treasury ergo mirroring the competences of the KRRiT. Therefore, the direct 
control over public media services was transferred from government to Council (Art. 17-19). 
The Council on National Media appoints and dismisses members of governing bodies of public 
radio, public television broadcasting and the Polish Press Agency, over which it has supervising 
powers (Art. 2). The Council consists of five members, two of which are appointed by the 
President of the Republic and three by the Sejm (Art. 3) with the term of six years (Art. 4).  The 
President can choose his or her nominees out of a pool of candidacies nominated by the 
opposition (Art. 6 (3-5)). The Council decides with a two-thirds majority (Art. 11 (2)).  
According to Reporters Without Borders, the Act “gives the CNM [Council on National Media, 
RMN] disproportionate prerogatives, allowing it to influence the editorial decisions of these 
media and put pressure on their directors” (Reporters Without Borders 2016). By spring 2016, 
RWP estimated that around 150 journalists had been fired, forced to resign or forced to take 
less senior positions (Reporters Without Borders 2016). The Helsinki Foundation for Human 
Rights and Article 19, a British human rights organisation specialised on freedom of expression 
and freedom of information, published a country report on the independence of public media 
service in Poland in January 2017 and was thus investigating the ‘Act on the Council on 
National Media’. They concluded that first, the governing party falls short on explaining the 
necessity of such a Council given the fact that the National Broadcasting Agency is in place 
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and anchored in the Constitution. The process of establishing this law is therefore unjustified 
and opaque. Second, the independence of the RMN is highly questionable. Three of its members 
are members of PiS and MPs. Third, the financial control over this body is managed by the 
Chief Officer of the Chancellery of Sejm and the body is therefore lacking financial autonomy 
and independence. Fourth, with the extensive competence to suppress or create high-level 
managerial positions within the public media service, the RMN de facto controls broadcasters 
and undermines their independence (Article 19/HFHR 2017: 16-17). 
In January 2017, the PiS politician Jacek Kurski was appointed to Director of TVP. 
Thenceforward, the news-programmes have been filled with propagandistic sentiments, 
praising the government’s actions. Kurski headhunted several journalists from conservative and 
right wing private media outlets who repeatedly praised the PiS party during the election 
campaign in 2015. Hence, public media services are no longer the ‘fourth power’ to supervise 
the government. Instead, they will praise the ‘good change’ (dobra zmina) pursued by the 
governing party (Kublik 2016: 155, 159). According to Bader and Zapart, the Polish media is 
highly polarized by dividing outlets and journalists into two groups arguing in favour or against 
the PiS government and its media reforms. Public media’s news programmes have turned into 
mouthpieces for the PiS government and private outlets are strongly divided on the 
government’s performances. The governing party keeps finding ways to damp criticism coming 
from private media outlets with, for example, the act of ‘repolonisation’. Three quarters of 
media outlets are owned by foreigners, predominantly Germans. The government frames these 
‘foreign’ media outlet as puppets of foreign states who deliberately try to undermine and 
weaken the Polish government (Bader/Zapart 2016: 134, 141, 145). 
Today, the private media sector remains diverse but public media outlets nevertheless reveal a 
strong bias towards the governing party and the control over public media could result in an 
uneven playing field in the upcoming elections (Chapman 2017: 6-8, 16), just like in Hungary. 
In the first quarter of 2016 the airtime for political parties was split unevenly: PiS was provided 
with 52% airtime and the opposition party PO with 23%. In the second quarter, the gap widened 
with 59% and 16% respectively (Arak/Bobiński 2017: 8). Furthermore, the influence of PiS on 
media outlets might ‘just’ be limited to public media services, yet it has to be noted that in 2015, 
15,9 million recipients have had access to terrestrial television, yet 11,5 million of them were 
only able to receive public television. Additionally, public television news programs dominate 
the sector since most private news channels are subject to a change. Hence, millions of Polish 
viewers only have access to propagandistic news provided by the state (Krzemiński 2017a: 4). 
In conclusion, the independence and freedom of press is continuously being limited by the 
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governing party. This process is mirrored in the World Press Freedom Index (see chapter 3.3. 
and footnote 7): 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Score 11.03 12.71 23.89 26.47 
Ranking 19 18 47 54 
 
 
The Freedom House Report on Press Freedom in Poland reveals several similarities between 
PiS’ and FIDESZ’ media strategies:  
Indeed, developments in Poland underscore a worrying trend toward illiberalism in the 
region, epitomized by Hungary since Viktor Orbán became prime minister in 2010. 
PiS’s changes to the public media and other institutions echo moves by Orbán over the 
past few years. Unlike Hungary, Poland still has a pluralistic private media, with outlets 
that are vocally critical of the government. As political pressure exacerbates their 
existing economic troubles, the question is how long these outlets will survive. 
(Chapman 2017: 2).  
Thus, the first pillar to the sub-regime of political rights, the freedom of press, is damaged. To 
fully assess the sub-regime of political rights, I will now investigate the freedom of association 
and the independent political sphere of action in accordance to Merkel. Currently, there are 
some limitations to the right of free assembly. In November 2016, the government adopted a 
bill illegalising counter-demonstrations and favouring assemblies organised by state or church 
over demonstrations organised by civil society. At first, President Duda did not sign this bill 
but rather referred it to the Constitutional Court (Arak/Bobiński 2017: 6). In March 2017, the 
Constitutional Court approved this draft to be constitutional and it came into force on April 2nd. 
According to Amnesty International, these restrictions have the potential to restrict the freedom 
of assembly in certain cases: On April 10th, 2017, the informal association ‘Citizens of the 
Republic of Poland’ (Obywatele RP) announced an assembly on a public place in Warsaw. Yet, 
every 10th of a month, another group of citizens, amongst them several politicians including 
Jarosław Kaczyński, commemorate the Smolensk plane crash, in which a former Polish 
President and the twin brother of Jarosław Kaczyński, Lech Kaczyński, died, in the same area. 
Hence, the association organised by (Obywatele RP) was banned by governmental officials 
(Amnesty International 2017b: 2).  
Figure four: World Press Freedom Index Poland – Scores and Ranking 2014 – 2017 
(Reporters Without Borders 2017b) 
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According to the Freedom House Report, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been 
facing numerous smear campaigns against them under the PiS government. The public 
broadcaster TVP-1 accused several NGOs of maintaining close links with the opposition parties 
and further claims that a large share of NGO budgets is allotted to board members’ salaries 
(Arak/Bobiński 2017: 8). Furthermore, and just like Hungary (see chapter 3.3.), Poland is keen 
on decreasing foreign support for Polish NGOs resulting from the EEA/Norway Grants NGO 
Fund by demanding the money to be channelled through a governmental body. Poland is the 
largest beneficiary of the Norwegian Fund, followed by Romania and Hungary. Norwegian 
Prime Minister Solberg warned against these ‘illiberal’ powers stating that "we [Norway] 
cannot allow Poland and Hungary to control the money to civil society. We must have 
independent organisations that assign them" (Eriksson 2017).  
Overall, the Polish government is keen on strengthening traditionalistic, nationalistic and 
catholic values. That is why magazines promoting such values get more funding under the PiS 
government than more liberal magazines do. The Ministry of Culture allocates around 3,5 
million Złoty (approx. 850,000€) to non-profit organisations publishing cultural and political 
magazines. In 2016, this founding was predominantly allocated to right-wing magazines since 
the Ministry wants to strengthen national identity (Arak/Bobiński 2017: 7).   
In conclusion, the governing party in several ways tries to increase their influence on civil 
society in order to strengthen their ideological sentiments within the public sphere. In this 
process, the independence of the political sphere is undermined and weakened. Thus, in 
combination with the violations on the freedom of press, the sub-regime of political rights is to 
some extent damaged and constitutionally anchored political rights are not being protected but 
rather violated by the governing party.   
3.4. Changes regarding civil rights in Hungary 
The constitution protects individuals from unjustified restraint as well as false imprisonment, 
and it grants the right to privacy, the right to own property as well as the freedom of religion 
(Art. IV, V, VI, VII). However, the BTI registered instances of violence, intimidation and hate 
speech against minorities, especially Roma, as well as xenophobic acts of discrimination 
against asylum seekers and refugees (BTI 2016a: 13). Orbán and other FIDESZ politicians 
frequently expresse the necessity of ‘ethnic homogeneity’ to the prosperity of the Hungarian 
nation and regarding its history, Orbán declared: “That history did not bury us [after World War 
One] is down to a few exceptional statesmen [like] Governor Miklos Horthy. That fact cannot 
be negated by Hungary's mournful role in World War Two." (Reuters 2017a), thereby 
rehabilitating a regime known for its collaboration with the Nazi-Regime.   
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Addressing the severe discriminations against Roma, the European Commission targeted school 
segregation of Roma children with the launch of an infringement procedure (European 
Commission Press Release Database 2016): 
The Commission has a number of concerns in relation to both Hungarian legislation and 
administrative practices which lead to the result that Roma children are 
disproportionately over-represented in special schools for mentally disabled children 
and also subject to a considerable degree of segregated education in mainstream schools. 
The school segregation results from a loophole in Hungarian legislation allowing segregation 
for ‘Roma evangelization’ (Hegedüs 2017: 8). Cleary this is violating the principle of civil 
liberties in embedded democracies. Another problematic constitutional legislation is written in 
Art. XXII. Whilst the state is obligated to provide shelter and public services to its citizens, the 
legislation includes a separate passage for homeless persons: “In order to protect public order, 
public security, public health and cultural values, an Act or a local government decree may, 
with respect to a specific part of public space, provide that staying in public space as a habitual 
dwelling shall be illegal.” (Art. XXII (3)). This sub-constitutional legislation had been annulled 
by the Constitutional Court due to its infringement upon human dignity. It was therefore 
declared as constitutional thus protecting it from annulment by the Constitutional Court (Tóth 
2013: 25) (this tactic will be further elaborated on in chapter 3.5.). Addressing a social problem 
like homelessness with sanctions instead of welfare state measures can be seen as violation of 
human dignity – as declared by the Hungarian Constitutional Court (Zeller 2013: 318-319). To 
summarise, the constitution may declare to protect civil liberties yet violations against this 
principle are evident. Before reaching a final conclusion, the second pillar to civil rights, namely 
equality before the law, shall be investigated.   
The constitution guarantees equality before the law regardless of gender, skin colour, social 
status, financial status, political party, parentage, origin, race, language, religion and equality 
for persons with disabilities (Art. XV (1-5)). Yet again, to some extent, restrictions to this 
principle can be found. The Hungarian constitution bears a strong ideological bias towards 
sentiments shared by the governing party. According to Küpper, the Hungarian constitution is 
one of the most ideologically charged constitutions in Europe (Küpper 2011: 138). Overall, the 
constitution declares the Christian-nationalistic worldview as the basic principle to the 
Hungarian nation and determines a specific, ethno-nationalistic, conservative way of live, 
thereby ignoring other normative and political concepts held by different parties, societies and 
individuals. The constitution further excludes a clear equalisation of different ways of life by 
advocating the nation as a Christian community. Worldviews that differ from Christian 
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traditions are deprived of an equal status (Küpper 2011: 138-139; Halmai 2011: 146-148). The 
preamble of the constitution itself suggests an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation. The 
preamble, as “national avowal”, declares:  
WE, THE MEMBERS OF THE HUNGARIAN NATION, at the beginning of the new 
millennium, with a sense of responsibility for every Hungarian, hereby proclaim the 
following: […] We promise to preserve the intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation 
torn apart in the storms of the last century. We proclaim that the nationalities living with 
us form part of the Hungarian political community and are constituent parts of the 
State.” (Constitution, Preamble). 
Hence, the creator of the constitution is the Hungarian ethnic community not a political 
community. The pronoun ‘we’ includes ethno-Hungarians living outside of Hungary, yet 
excludes ethnic minorities with Hungarian citizenship. The minorities are addressed with ‘they’ 
and the integration of minor ethnic communities only refers to a ‘political community’. This 
nationalistic preamble fails to provide a neutral framework and falls short on inclusiveness. 
According to Tóth and Halmai, the basic pattern of values encourages a logic of friend and foe 
whereby the ‘foe’ is not only outside but also inside Hungarian borders. The preamble and the 
constitution aim to unify the country on the basis of ethnic and historic affiliations instead of 
constitutional patriotism (Tóth 2013: 24; Halmai 2011: 146). Furthermore, the preamble not 
only has a propagandistic but also a legal impact since Art. R (3) of the Constitution declares 
that “[t]he provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be interpreted in accordance with their 
purposes, the National Avowal contained therein and the achievements of our historical 
constitution” and according to Art. I (3), “[a] fundamental right may only be restricted to allow 
the effective use of another fundamental right or to protect a constitutional value […]”. Hence, 
the preamble does have the potential to foster a de facto division between national and non-
national exercise of fundamental rights (Küpper 2012b: 185) granting the government the 
possibility to declare any unwanted exercise of fundamental rights as ‘unnational’ and thereby 
restrict such actions. This ideology might only be shared by a portion of the population yet it 
gains a binding character to all citizens and to the state (Küpper 2011: 144; Halmai 2011: 148). 
Such a distinction translates into strong xenophobic and nationalistic sentiments spread by 
politicians, authorities, media outlets etc. The high intolerance towards refugees and 
immigrants dominates the political field. According to the Nations in Transit Report, 
xenophobia and intolerance have become mainstream and turned into key aspects of Hungarian 
politics (Hegedüs 2017: 4).  
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In conclusion, the constitution protects individual liberties from violation of rights by state and 
private agents and promotes the equality before the law. Yet the constitution also fosters an 
ethno-nationalistic understanding of nation thereby excluding ethnic minorities in several, more 
or less subtle ways. Additionally, the discourse in Hungary is shaped by racist, xenophobic, and 
anti-Semitic nationalistic beliefs causing structural discrimination towards minorities that is 
culminating, for example, in school segregation of Roma. Therefore, the sub-regime of civil 
rights can be considered damaged. The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index rates civil 
rights with 8.  
3.4.1. Outlook: Changes regarding civil rights in Poland 
In 2015, shortly after the PiS government took power, President Duda vetoed ‘The Amendment 
on the Law on National, Ethnic Minorites, and Regional Languages’, which had been passed 
by the previous parliament and would have given minorities the right to use their mother tongue 
as ‘supportive language’ on regional level. Yet, according to Duda, implementing this law 
allegedly cost too much money and would have created a high burden on local government’s 
budget. However, according to Ryszard Galla who represents the German minority in the Sejm, 
the costs are minimal if they even existed at all (Nijakowski 2016: 9).  
In November 2016, the ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ published its 
concluding observations on Poland, highlighting, next to a few positive remarks, many concerns 
and recommendations. Amongst these concerns is the increase of violence, hate speech and 
discrimination based on race, nationality, ethnicity, religion and sexual orientation especially 
in light of insufficient response by the authorities (International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 2016: 2-7). Due to the fact that numerous governmental officials adopted such 
discriminatory speech, Vetter declares PiS as spearhead of xenophobia (Vetter 2016: 32).  
Furthermore, the Convent criticises that the abolishment of the ‘Council for Prevention of 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance’ in April 2016 was executed whilst 
failing to implement a substitute institution. Additionally, the Convent reports undue delays in 
court proceedings, difficulties in accessing legal assistance during arrests and instances of 
insufficient respect for the confidentiality of communication between counsel and clients and 
questions the fairness of trials due to the lack of independence of judges, and judicial reforms 
(see chapter 3.5.1.). Juveniles have reportedly faced sanctions without presumption of 
innocence and without their guilt being proven, in that they have temporarily been placed in 
isolation rooms as a form of disciplinary and pretrial detention which reportedly exceeded three 
months (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2016: 7). The Report of the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published in May 2017 echoed 
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all concerns issued by the Convent (Human Rights Council 2017: 2-5). Additionally, the ‘Act 
of 10 June 2016 on Anti-terrorist Activities and on Amendments to other Acts’ passed by Sejm 
and the Senate is being criticised for its wide definition of terrorist crimes as “overly broad 
[which] does not adequately define the nature and consequences of the acts concerned”, thereby 
giving authorities excessive discretion in cases of ‘events of terrorist nature’ (Art. 14, 17, 21) 
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2016: 2). Amnesty International points 
out, that the extended mandate of the Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa 
Wewnętrznego, ABW) regarding the surveillance powers is highly problematic. The Head of 
the ABW, who is also the Minister of Justice, has sole competences in all questions concerning 
surveillance, security and intelligence operations and is granted access to virtually every 
government agency (Art. 4). The risk of abuses of power is thus severely increased and the bill 
“helps set the stage for unprecedented access -- since the collapse of the Soviet Union -- by 
state authorities to the personal data and other information of Polish citizens and others present 
or residing on Polish territory” (Amnesty International 2016: 1). The Venice Commission 
criticised that the bill failed to install sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent excessive use 
of surveillance powers and thus eased unjustified interference with the privacy of individuals 
(Venice Commission 2016a: 32). The right to privacy and thus the protection of individuals 
from violations by the state as pillar to the third sub-regime is not fully protected, especially 
since a member of the executive, namely the Minister of Justice, has been granted with 
extensive authority and thus security operations and surveillance are in the hands of the 
executive.  
In conclusion, the efforts to prevent discrimination against minorities are unsatisfactory, since 
the state is not capable to fully guarantee individual liberties from violations by private agents. 
As in Hungary, the highly problematic discriminatory rhetoric by authorities implies a lack of 
protection of such violations by the state. The equality before the law cannot be fully guaranteed 
by the state either. The right to privacy and the protection of violations to unjustified 
interventions on individuals is not guaranteed. The sub-regime of civil rights thus displays some 
violations. In order to evaluate the dimension of liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law, I 
will now investigate the horizontal accountability in both countries.   
3.5. Changes regarding horizontal accountability in Hungary 
The dimension of liberal constitutionalism and rule of law both addresses the sub-regimes civil 
rights and horizontal accountability. In order to now investigate on the latter, I will examine the 
division of power, the level of independence of the judiciary as well as possible power abuse 
 
 
31 
 
and its prosecution. Yet due to the quantity and complexity of these polity changes, I will only 
highlight the most significant and problematic institutional changes. 
One of the main subjects of this debate will be the most recent constitution including its 
amendments. Shortly after the elections in 2010, the new government decided to implement a 
new constitution. The aim to have it implemented within the next year was fulfilled, yet to the 
detriment of an inclusive, deliberative and sufficient debate amongst the civil society, legal 
experts or even the opposition. A debate within the parliament was just a formal procedure 
since, due to the tight schedule, the constitution had to be voted upon merely one month after 
its introduction. The new constitution was de facto a product of discourse only amongst 
FIDESZ politicians (Küpper 2011: 137; Rupnik 2012: 133; Kornai 2015: 35). The constitution 
was voted upon on April 18th, 2011, signed by the President on April 25th and came into power 
on January 1st, 2012.  
The constitution declares the division of powers as basic principle (Art. C (1)). Yet, not only 
does the constitution debilitate fundamental principles of civil and political rights (see chapter 
3.3. and 3.4.), but also to the judiciary, especially of the Constitutional Court and therefore to 
the balance of power itself. The structure of the Constitutional Court has been changed in 
several ways: Article 24 (8) of the constitution declares that the number of members increased 
from eleven to 15 and their terms were prolonged from nine to twelve years. The president of 
the court is to be elected with a two-thirds majority of parliament and not by the court itself as 
before (Art. 24 (8)), which might be a widely accepted practise but still can be seen as a minor 
backlash in the independence of the Constitutional Court (Venice Commission 2011: 20). Yet 
this reform granted FIDESZ the opportunity to appoint several judges to the Constitutional 
Court within three years of governance, thereby limiting the independence of the judiciary 
(Scheppele 2015: 115). Today, the Constitutional Court is strongly biased towards the 
government with eleven out of 15 judges having been elected by the FIDESZ fraction of the 
parliament (Hegedüs 2017: 9; Küpper 2011: 140). This personal conformity within the 
Constitutional Courts strongly endangers the court’s independence and shapes the jurisdiction 
for years since the judges’ terms of office lasts twelve years which corresponds with three 
legislative periods (Halmai 2011: 150). 
What’s most important for this assessment is the reduction of competences of the Constitutional 
Court under FIDESZ. First, the court can no longer litigate amendments to Constitutional Law 
due to Article 24 (5): “The Constitutional Court may review the Fundamental Law or the 
amendment of the Fundamental Law only in relation to the procedural requirements laid down 
in the Fundamental Law for its making and promulgation.” Using the two-thirds majority in 
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parliament, the leading party declared legislations on sub-constitutional level as constitutional, 
when the court tended towards annulment (e.g. as happened with Art. XXII (3), see chapter 
3.4.), thus avoiding the review (Sólyom 2013: 7). Eventually, this mechanism became a routine 
and an embedded parliamentary practice since the parliament claimed the right to have 
superiority over the Constitutional Court regarding the question of constitutionality of 
legislation (Sólyom 2013: 8). The qualified majority in parliament thus obtains the possibility 
of adopting any provision in the form of an amendment to the constitutional law, even if they 
diametrically oppose other constitutional provisions (Sólyom 2013: 10). According to the 
Venice Commission, this mechanism “threatens to deprive the Constitutional Court of its main 
function as the guardian of constitutionality and as a control organ in the democratic system of 
checks and balances” (Venice Commission 2013: 32). Second, the Constitutional Court can no 
longer base their jurisdiction on case-law previous to the Constitution of 2011 and its 
amendments, which interrupts the court’s case-law. This constitutes a severe drawback to the 
constitutional development of the past 20 years and can be seen as the symbolic ‘beginning’ of 
a new Hungary (Sólyom 2013: 10-11). Third, the court is only required to review taxes, duties 
and contributions, customs duties as well as the central conditions for local taxes for conformity 
with the Fundamental Law in regard to the rights to life and human dignity, to the protection of 
personal data, to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, or the rights related to Hungarian 
citizenship. The Court can annul these Acts exclusively for the violation of these rights. This 
constraint applies when the state debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product (Art. 37 (4)). 
This effect clearly degenerates the Constitutional Court’s competences due to political motives, 
since most budgetary laws do not even address, let alone violate these fundamental rights 
(Halmai 2011: 149).  
With the new constitution, complaints regarding fundamental law and amendments of 
fundamental law can only be submitted to the Constitutional Court by the President of the 
Republic, the Government, one-fourth of the Members of the National Assembly, the President 
of the Curia [the Supreme Court], the Prosecutor General or the Commissioner for Fundamental 
Rights (Ombudsperson) within thirty days of promulgation (Art. 24 5b). Hence, the spectre of 
different types of procedures was also changed. The ‘actio popularis’, the popular action against 
the state based on normative judicial review in front of the Constitutional Court was annulled. 
It was replaced with a ‘constitutional complaint’ as review of conformity with the Fundamental 
Law of any legal regulation applied in a particular case or of any judicial decision (Art. 24, (2c, 
d)). But if the Constitutional Court can only review popular complaints based on individual 
concernment, the court will barely be able to rule in cases addressing the division of power or 
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institutional architecture which endangers the protection of the constitution by “[m]aking it 
difficult for this Court to reach all constitutional violations [which] creates blind spots in which 
unconstrained political discretion can override constitutional values” (Scheppele 2015: 116; 
Bánkuti/Halmai/Scheppele 2012: 142-143). Halmai agrees by declaring that the constitutional 
complaint is by no means a sufficient replacement for the ‘actio popularis’ (Halmai 2011: 150).  
The effect of disempowerment of the Constitutional Court is worsened by the high number of 
cardinal laws (sarkalatos törvény). These laws have been mentioned several times before in this 
thesis (see chapters 3.2., 3.3.). Cardinal laws are adopted by a qualified majority and can 
therefore only be changed with such a majority. Whilst regular and cardinal laws are formally 
of equal ranks, cardinal laws de facto rank between constitutional laws and regular laws. 
Cardinal laws were part of the former constitution and are therefore not a new instrument 
implemented by the current governing party. Yet, the current as well as the former constitution 
do not specify which laws can be declared cardinal. Even though the government under FIDESZ 
did not pass significantly more cardinal laws, they exploited the existing institutional structures 
by declaring not only crucial and lasting legislations on fundamental issues to cardinal laws but 
rather legislations addressing areas of economic and social ‘day-to-day’ policies 
(Sonnevend/Jakab/Csink 2015: 78-79). As the parliament used this instrument to cement the 
economic, social, fiscal, family, educational etc. policies of the governing party, this misuse of 
cardinal laws contradicts with the principle of parliamentarianism and the temporal division of 
power (Halmai 2011: 152). Future parliaments will most likely not be able to revise cardinal 
laws, even if FIDESZ were to be in the opposition (Lang 2015: 3). The Venice Commission 
criticised: “The more policy issues are transferred beyond the powers of simple majority, the 
less significance will future elections have and the more possibilities does a two-thirds majority 
have of cementing its political preferences and the country’s legal order.” (Venice Commission 
2013: 29).  
Not only did the governing party reduce the influence of the judiciary but also that of the 
parliament. In practise, the legislative and the executive are no longer separate powers since 
both are controlled by the executive’s dominance with Orbán “at the very pinnacle of power” 
(Kornai 2015: 35). The parliament had been down-sized to a ‘law factory’ with no preparatory 
work on the bills themselves. According to Kornai, between 2010 and 2014, 88 legislations 
were introduced and voted upon within a week and in 13 cases this procedure happened only 
within one or two days. The parliament had de facto been revoked its power to create legislation 
(Kornai 2015: 35). Furthermore, the parliament was de jure deprived of its most crucial veto-
power available, namely the decision over the budget. Whilst the constitution declares in Article 
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N (1-2) that parliament and government have primary responsibility for the observance of the 
principle of balanced, transparent and sustainable budget management, Article 44 confirms that 
the parliament only passes the budget when the newly implemented Budget Council, which 
consists of three members (the President of the Budget Council, the Governor of the National 
Bank of Hungary and the President of the State Audit Office), has given its consent to the 
parliamentary draft. The members of the Budget Council are however closely linked to 
FIDESZ. Both the President of the Budget Council and the Governor of the National Bank of 
Hungary are appointed by the President of the Republic for six years (Art. 41 (3); Art. 44 (4)). 
The President of the Republic, János Áder, as a founding member of FIDESZ, is a loyal 
politician who refrains from criticising major bills (BTI 2016a: 10). The President of the State 
Audit Office is appointed by the parliament for twelve years. Hence, FIDESZ established a 
veto-player position for itself: If the parliament fails to adopt the central budget for the year in 
question by March 31st, possibly due to failed consensus or blockade, the President can dissolve 
the parliament and schedule new elections (Art. 3 (3)) (Küpper 2011: 139). The strong influence 
on this institution gives FIDESZ “dead-hand control” over future elected governments since 
the veto-position “will hang like the Sword of Damocles” over their terms of office 
(Bánkuti/Halmai/Scheppele 2012: 144). Depriving the Parliament of its budgetary sovereignty 
dismantles the parliamentary character of the regime (Küpper 2011: 139) and eradicates it of 
one of its core control mechanisms can only be called “kupierter Parlamentarismus” (Küpper 
2012b: 83). In conclusion, the balance of power is severely damaged since the Constitutional 
Court is extremely limited in their mandate of power, and the judges are not independent thus 
the jurisdiction is biased towards favouring the government’s interest. Checks and balances are 
therefore dismantled due to harsh restriction on both the courts and the parliament which have 
been implemented by the executive. In order to fully assess the sub-regime of horizontal 
accountability, I will now investigate on possible abuse of power. 
In autumn 2014, the U.S. government refused to issue visas for six governmental officials due 
to corruption allegations. According to the ‘Sustainable Governance Indicators Report 2016’, 
corruption has been a “widespread systemic feature” with government officials and the FIDESZ 
elite having been involved in several corruption scandals whilst accumulating fast-growing 
wealth. Victor Orbáns son-in-law triggered public suspicion since he became a multi-billionaire 
in a suspiciously short period of time. Hence, pervasive corruption fostered a clientele system 
with thousands of loyal supporters (Ágh/Dieringer 2016: 4, 18). The director of the anti-
corruption agency, the Prosecution Service, who is the main prosecutor, has been elected by the 
parliament after the executive had appointed him. Thus, most corruption scandals involving 
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governmental officials or individuals enjoying close ties with such officials, have not been 
investigated upon. However, corruption scandals involving opposition politicians have been 
intensively scrutinised upon and were accompanied by great media coverage (Kornai 2015: 35-
36). Furthermore, the government installed its own supporters within the leadership of several 
supervisory, watchdog and whistle-blower institutions, such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
the State Audit Office, the Monetary Council, the Competition Authority, the Central Statistical 
Office and the Hungarian National Bank (BTI 2016a: 10; Kornai 2015: 35). According to 
Transparency International, the ‘corruption perceptions score’6 of Hungary perpetually 
worsened since FIDESZ took over the government. In 2012 Hungary scored 55 whereas in 2016 
it decreased to 48, with Hungary being ranked 57th out of 176 nations (Transparency 
International 2017a). To summarise, Freedom House diagnosed a “reverse state capture” due 
to politicians using the state institutions to establish corruption networks to reward loyal 
oligarchs (Hegedüs 2016: 9). Non-transparent policymaking and the misuse of public funds 
established high-level corruption “as organic part of the regime’s functioning” whilst the 
government increased prosecution capacity on fighting low-level corruption (Hegedüs 2016: 
9). These concerns were echoed by the perpetually increasing level of opaque policy making 
and misuse of funds in the ‘2017 Nations in Transit Report on Hungary’ (Hegedüs 2017: 10). 
Around 70% of public procurement comprise corruption, with costs rising to up to 25%. Taking 
into consideration that the total sum of public procurement constitutes 6% of the annual GDP 
in 2014, the fiscal damage caused by corruption accumulates to 1% of GDP (Hegedüs 2016:10). 
In conclusion, the Constitution is a conglomerate of democratic and anti-democratic rules and 
principles and is perfectly tailored to a one-party system. The rule of law does no longer 
sufficiently limit and control the executive and the legislative, rather does the executive rule 
through the law (Tóth 2013: 26). The division of power is severely damaged due to the 
deprivation of power from the judiciary, especially the Constitutional Court. The Court no 
longer hast the right to review and annul constitutional legislation, thus depriving it of one of 
its core mechanisms. The veto capacity of the Court is thereby reduced to an alarming extent. 
The level of independence of the judiciary is low since crucial supervision institutions are 
infiltrated with government supporters. The Venice Commission proves that the Constitution, 
including the amendments “is the result of an instrumental view of the Constitution as a political 
                                                 
6 Transparency International allocates data on how corrupt the countries’ public sectors are seen to be with 0 
(highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). The scores of 176 countries are then ranked from low corruption perceptions 
scores to high corruption perceptions scores. For more information see: 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016. 
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means of the governmental majority and is a sign of the abolition of the essential difference 
between constitution-making and ordinary politics” and causes a threat to the constitutional 
system of checks and balances (Venice Commission 2013: 32). Corruption assists the 
government by expanding the group of loyal supporters as well as by accumulating the wealth 
of the loyal governmental elite. The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index rates 
Hungary’s separation of powers with 5, the judiciary independence with 6 and the prosecution 
of power abuse with 7. Bearing in mind the violations to civil liberties as illustrated in chapter 
3.4., the dimension of liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law is severely damaged. The 
judicative and the legislative do not have sufficient control over an aggrandised executive which 
can be seen as the most ‘disembedded’ institution observed through Merkels concept of 
embedded democracy.  
3.5.1. Outlook: Changes regarding horizontal accountability in Poland 
In contrast to FIDESZ, PiS does not possess a two-thirds majority in neither the Sejm nor the 
Senate. Therefore, the Polish government has not not able to change the constitution as easily 
as the Hungarian government has been able to do. Nevertheless, the PiS party did pass 
numerous bills undermining and blocking the Constitutional Court in several ways in order to 
pass controversial laws that would otherwise have been rejected by the Constitutional Tribunal. 
Furthermore, leading PiS politicians and the Polish president voiced their willingness to change 
the Constitution via referendum (Polen-Analysen 2016b: 17; 2017a: 9; Vetter 2017c: 13) 
although no respective actions have been taken so far. In this chapter, I will illustrate major 
reforms passed by the government which led to an extensive dismantlement and 
disempowerment of the Constitutional Court, its Tribunal as well as the Ordinary Courts.   
At the end of June 2015, the liberal coalition of PO and PSL had passed a new law regarding 
Constitutional Court’s matters. This law allowed the Sejm to elect successors to all 
constitutional judges, whose term of office expired in the second half of 2015. Some 
constitutional judges had ended their term just shortly after the change of the parliamentary 
majority. This affected two out of five judges who had been elected by PO and PSL a few weeks 
before the end of their reign. Although the terms of office had expired for three judges, the 
newly elected president, Andrzej Duda, refused to swear in their successors, who had been 
elected by the previous government. On November 19th, 2015, at an unprecedented rate, the 
parliament ignored the amendment to the constitutional law passed by the previous parliament 
by adopting an amendment law, which declared the election of all five constitutional judges as 
invalid. Within two days, this amendment was voted upon by both chambers of parliament, was 
signed by the President and was published in the Journal of Laws. One day before the meeting 
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of the Constitutional Court at December 12th, the Sejm elected five other judges who were 
immediately sworn in by the President during the same night (Bucholc/Komornik 2016: 80). 
However, the refusal of President Duda to swear in judges who had been appointed by the 
parliament constitutes an abuse of power. The act of swearing-in is supposed to be merely 
symbolic. Yet, by imposing such a blockade, the president misused his power by influencing 
the process of the appointment of judges. Furthermore, by appointing five new judges, he broke 
with a verdict of the Constitutional Court, which, on December 3rd, had declared that the 
‘abortive’ appointment of two judges was unconstitutional, but the choice of the other three 
judges was valid and thus they had to be sworn in. The President himself argued that he was 
merely guided by the will of the newly elected parliament. The President however is an 
independent supervisory authority as guardian of the constitution and should not subordinate 
himself to the parliament. One can agree with Bucholc and Komornik when pointing out that 
equalising the rule of law with the will of Parliament is at least a questionable step 
(Buchloc/Komornik 2016: 81-82).  
On December 5th, the Sejm voted in favour of a resolution removing the President and the Vice-
President of the Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjny, TK). Later that month, the 
Sejm passed the ‘Law of 22 December 2015 on Amending the Constitutional Tribunal Law’, 
which was confirmed by the Senate on December 24th. This amendment was aimed to paralyse 
the Tribunal’s adjudicating activity so that the Sejm was free to pass further amendments, and 
of course this amendment itself, without them being immediately reviewed and possibly 
rejected by the court (as illustrated in chapter 3.3.1. regarding the Media Laws) (Łączkowski 
2016: 51-52). This amendment, according to Łączkowski, who is a professor of law and a 
former judge to the TK, entails three main elements preventing the TK from sufficiently 
performing its duties. First, the minimum number of judges composing a full bench was 
increased from nine to 13 (Art. 1 (3)). The president of the TK was therefore obligated to 
recognise all five newly appointed judges in order to reach a full bench despite the fact that this 
recognition would breach the December 3rd verdict on the unconstitutional nature of the 
appointment of three judges. Furthermore, the Tribunal must decide with absolute instead of a 
simple majority (Art. 1 (3)). Second, the TK is now committed to hear cases in order of 
submission and not relevance (Art. 10)). Therefore, the Court can only review such crucial 
amendments when proceedings of all previous cases have ended, which causes a major delay 
to the TK’s work. Third, the amendment failed to provide a vacation legis and came into power 
immediately, causing the TK to be blocked instantly (Art. 5). Vacation legis describes the 
period between the announcement of a law and the time the law takes legal effect. By 
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eliminating this period, the parliament prevented the TK from reviewing this Act on its 
constitutionality (Łączkowski 2016: 54-55). Łączkowski regards these changes as a “serious 
concern as to the future of the democratic State ruled by law” and urges that “the CT 
[Constitutional Tribunal, TK] must be allowed to perform its principal functions even if this 
were to hinder the achievement of particular aims of some political fractions in power. For there 
is no guarantee that these aims are, or will be, identical with the true common good.” 
(Łączkowski 2016: 56). The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (HFHR) highlights 
additional, crucial changes initiated with the December 22nd Amendment: Hearings cannot be 
considered earlier than three or six7 months after notification (Art. 1 (12a)). In particularly 
serious cases, a judge can be removed from office by the Sejm and disciplinary proceedings 
against a judge can be initiated by the Minister of Justice or the President of Poland (Art 1 (5)). 
The HFHR as well as the Venice Commission in its ‘Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional 
Tribunal’ consider all these vital changes to the TK as violations to the judicial independence, 
the independent and separate character of the judicial power and the separation of powers and 
thus as causing the TK to be paralysed. The procedure of passing this Amendment infringed 
upon the rules of the legislative procedure, due to the fact that this legislation was passed in a 
very short period of time as well as the lack of consultation with experts and civil society 
(Venice Commission 2016b: 23-24; Szuleka/Wolny/Szwed 2016: 28-30).  
Despite the newly established practise to review cases in order of submission and not relevance, 
the Constitutional Court decided to nevertheless review the amendments to the Constitutional 
Tribunal, which further escalated the conflict (Gostyńska-Jakubowska 2016). On March 9th, 
2016, the judgement ruled that ‘Law of 22 December 2015 on Amending the Constitutional 
Tribunal Law’ (case K 47/15), is unconstitutional due to the following reasons: First, the pace 
of legislation procedure made it impossible to have an actual consideration of the draft, even 
though many concerns had been voiced. The parliament failed to provide sufficient reading of 
all amendments and it did not consult the draft with relevant bodies. These violations in the 
legislative procedure deprived the amendment of a democratic mandate and substantive 
legitimacy. All the above-mentioned reforms were declared unconstitutional because they 
deliberately aimed at blocking and paralyzing the Constructional Court. The amendments made 
it impossible for the TK to act thoroughly and effectively. According to the Tribunal, the 
principle of the rule of law is violated since the amendment interferes with the Tribunal’s 
independence and jeopardises the separation from other powers (Szuleka/ Wolny/ Szwed 2016: 
33). Yet, on March 10th, the Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Beata Kempa, 
                                                 
7 In the case of proceedings which require a full bench 
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declared that the verdict will not be published in the Journal of Laws and thereby will not be 
acknowledged and will be considered non-binding since the Court did not decide according to 
applicable law (Polen-Analysen 2016a: 12). The Venice Commission addressed this issue by 
strongly recommending the publication of the judgement urging the Polish authorities to avoid 
a deepening of the constitutional crisis. The Venice Commission’s ‘Opinion on the 
Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland’ declares that 
“[a] refusal to publish judgment 47/15 of 9 March 2016 would not only be contrary to the rule 
of law, such an unprecedented move would further deepen the constitutional crisis triggered by 
the election of judges in autumn 2015 and the Amendments of 22 December 2015” (Venice 
Commission 2016c: 25).  
In June 2016, the European Commission adopted an ‘Opinion on the Rule of Law’ in Poland 
since, despite extensive dialogue between the Commission and the Polish government, the 
constitutional crisis, in the eyes of the Commission, had not been resolved and no concrete steps 
had been taken by the Polish government to address the Commission’s concerns. The concerns 
are threefold: First, the Commission addresses the appointment of judges to the Constitutional 
Tribunal and points out that the composition of the Tribunal remains disputed between the Court 
and the State, which raises concerns regarding the rule of law. Second, the functioning of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, next to the evident incompatibility with the rule of law, has led to a 
high level of uncertainty regarding constitutional justice, because the Court has decided to rule 
in accordance with the rules applicable before 22 December 2015. Since March 9th, none of the 
verdicts had been published in the Journal of Law and all future rulings will face continuous 
controversy. Third, highly controversial legislations, like the Media Laws (see chapter 3.3.) 
cannot be sufficiently and effectively reviewed by the Constitutional Court due to its blockade 
resulting in (possibly) unconstitutional legislation being exercised (European Commission Fact 
Sheet 2016: 1-3). Thus, the governing party is able to enforce arbitrary reforms without checks 
and balances due to the reduced authority of the Constitutional Court and the paralysis of the 
pronouncement of verdicts. The review of constitutionality by the Constitutional Court is no 
longer a safety valve, hence the division of power is to some extend disabled 
(Buchloc/Komornik 2016: 82). The ‘Third Recommendation on the Rule of Law in Poland’ by 
the European Commission echoes this evaluation and also criticises the lack of a legitimate and 
independent constitutional review due to a de facto decomposition of the Constitutional 
Tribunal resulting in the fact that the constitutionality of Polish laws can no longer be 
guaranteed (European Commission 2017: 8).   
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The argument advocated by PiS politicians regarding the replacement and early retirement of 
judges was the need for a ‘de-communisation’. Allegedly, the judiciary has been a pinnacle of 
disempowered communists for 28 years and that is why, according to Kaczyński, the judiciary 
ought to have a new beginning (Vetter 2017a: 3; Buchloc; Komornik 2016: 92). Hence, not 
only was the Constitutional Court affected by numerous reforms, but Ordinary Courts as well. 
That is why, after undermining the capability and the independence of the Constitutional 
Tribunal, the governing party limited the independence of judges in other courts of justice. In 
July 2017, the Sejm and the Senate passed three significant bills: The ‘Law amending the Law 
on the Ordinary Courts Organisation’, the ‘Law amending the Law on the National Council for 
the Judiciary and certain other Laws’ and the ‘Law on the Supreme Court’. The last two of 
these bills were vetoed by President Duda which caused major tensions within the party as well 
as between party members and President Duda. Party officials are determined to overrule the 
President’s veto with a three-fifths majority in the Sejm. Duda himself is going to present 
different versions of these bills to the Sejm. That is why, even though the two laws were vetoed 
and are thus not subject to the assessment on the status quo of the state of democracy, I will still 
provide an analysis on the content of both of them in the annex.  
On July 25th, President Duda signed the ‘Law amending the Law on the Ordinary Courts 
Organisation’. Right after the bill had been signed, it came into power and significantly 
extended the mandate of the Minister of Justice. The minister Zbigniew Ziobr can recall all 
Presidents and Vice-Presidents of Ordinary Courts as well as the Directors of chambers, without 
having to give reason and he can replace this personnel with judges of his own choosing (Vetter 
2017c: 8). The amendment further changes the procedure of the promotion of judges without 
specifying the criteria for promotion, which can lead to arbitrariness in the procedure. The 
influence on the judiciary further increases by the fact that, due to a legislation passed in January 
2016, the Minister of Justice is also the Attorney General. Therefore, not only does the Minister 
of Justice appoint the judges in court but he is also directly involved in proceedings as a party. 
This Amendment clearly violates not only the independence of judges but also Article 45 of the 
Constitution of Poland on the independence of the Polish judiciary (Amnesty International 
2017c). Furthermore, the Amendment transfers all judges on the Supreme Court into retirement, 
except for those who are explicitly allowed to stay by the Minister of Justice. The ages of 
retirement were changed as well: Female judges retire with 60, male judges with 65 (Machińska 
2017: 5), which clearly constitutes a discrimination based on gender (European Commission 
Press Release 2017c). The Minister of Justice can grant judges an extension of their mandates 
(male judges: up to ten years, female judges: up to five years). The influence of the Minister of 
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Justice is not limited by clear criteria, regulations or time frame on the prolongation of judges’ 
mandates, which violates the principle of the irremovability of judges. This discretionary power 
harshly undermines the principle of division of power. Based on these violations, the European 
Commission initiated an infringement procedure addressing the rule of law in Poland (European 
Commission Press Release 2017c). Machińska further points out that the reorganisation of the 
formal procedures in Ordinary Courts has had negative consequences on the proceedings which 
implies that the reorganisation is merely based on political motives. The Presidents of the 
reorganised chambers are to be appointed by the President of the Republic based on 
recommendations of the Minister of Justice. This reorganisation further inhibits the separation 
of powers as well as the independence of the Judiciary from other powers (Machińska 2017: 
5). Vetter echoes her concerns and argues that one might consider these reforms as a politically 
motivated cleansing of the judiciary in order to infiltrate PiS ideological, political and moral 
sentiments into all aspects of government. Thereby, the judiciary is reduced to a subordinate 
status to the more dominant executive and hence the PiS party (Vetter 2017c: 8).  
In conclusion, Adam Łazowski, who is a professor at Westminster Lawschool, summarises that 
the boundaries between the judicative, legislative and executive are blurred and the trust in the 
judiciary system is gone. No institution in Poland is capable to protect the constitution 
thoroughly and sufficiently. The Constitutional Tribunal largely consist of PiS loyalists while 
the independence of courts all over the country is dismantled. Recommendations given by the 
European Commission, the European Parliament, the Venice Commission, the OSCE and many 
other institutions, individuals and especially recommendations, concerns and amendments 
given by the opposition have been ignored. If all proposed laws had come into force, the 
tripartite division of power would have ended (Łazowski 2017: 1-3). Whether or in what way 
the vetoed bills will come into power after all remains to be seen. Several PiS politicians, 
including Jarosław Kaczyński, have publicly declared that the vetoes by President Duda were 
a mistake and the reforms in the judiciary will come into power eventually (Polen-Analysen 
2017c: 16-17; Polen-Analysen 2017d: 12). 
As in Hungary, the judicative is not the only branch of government being deprived of its rights, 
but also is the parliament. In December 2016, the Sejm’s speaker excluded the opposition MP 
Michal Szczerba (PO) from parliamentary debate on the 2017 national budget, which led to 
protests being sparked by the opposition. In order to object to this exclusion but also to a 
temporary regulation on excluding journalists from the parliamentary building, the opposition 
blocked the Podium. The Sejm’s speaker then moved the session into a different room. The 
voting procedure, for the first time in Polish politics since 1989, wasn’t conducted in the Sejm’s 
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plenary room and with only a handful of members of the opposition and without media. The 
opposition opposed the procedure and declared the voting invalid and the budget plan 
illegitimate. The so-called ‘Sejm-Crisis’ continued until mid-January, because the opposition 
continued to block the plenary room and protesters organised demonstrations in front of the 
parliamentary building (Arak/Bobiński 2017: 4). On January 13th, President Duda signed the 
budget plan for 2017. Almost all opposition parties refused to acknowledge the voting 
procedure as legal arguing that not enough law-makers were present during the vote. The 
required number of deputies is 230 and according to the summary of votes published by the 
Sejm, 236 MPs were present with 234 MPs voting in favour of the budget plan. However, 
individual voting results have so far not been published which is unusual (Reuters 2017b). The 
Polish ombudsman for civil rights and former judge on the Constitutional Tribunal, Adam 
Bodnar, argued that the Sejm-crisis is another factette on the blockade of the Constitutional 
Court. In an interview with the EUobserver he commented (Eriksson 2016):  
The constitutional tribunal could determine whether the budget was passed in breach of 
law, but in the lack of a functioning court, we are left with the arguments of the political 
parties and the protesters. This is another example of the absence of rule of law creating 
tensions, which are completely unnecessary and very dangerous. 
In order to finalise the assessment on the horizontal separation of power, I will now investigate 
possible abuses of power. The Polish government faces several accusations regarding 
corruption and nepotism in state-owned enterprises (SOE). The opposition was able to publish 
names and affiliations of members of PiS and their largely unqualified appointments to SOE 
positions. One of the most notable cases is Bartłomiej Misiewicz, who is a spokesperson and 
advisor to the Ministry of Defence and was selected for the supervisory board as direct 
representative of the Ministry of Defence despite not having the required university degree 
(Arak/Bobiński 2017: 11-12). Yet, according to the Nations in Transit Report, the intensity of 
corruption did not increase under the PiS government with a steady rating on corruption since 
2014 (Arak/Bobiński 2017: 11). The BTI rates the 2016 Polish anti-corruption policy with 8 
arguing that the government implemented several anti-corruption policies which decreased the 
level of corruption over the past years (BTI 2016b: 23). According to Transparency 
International, Poland’s score on perceived corruption (see chapter 3.5.) perpetually improved 
over the years from 58 out of 100 in 2012 and 62 in 2015 and 2016 with Poland ranking at place 
30 out of 176 countries in 2015 and rank at place 29 in 2016 (Transparency International 2017b; 
Wiśniewska 2016). 
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In conclusion, both chambers of parliament were able to pass several laws and amendments to 
disempower and dismantle the Constitutional Court as well as Ordinary Courts. The 
Constitutional Court was brought in line with the governing party and their policies. Verdicts 
that are contrary to the party’s wishes were not published in the Journal of Law. The Minister 
of Justice, who is also Attorney General, was granted an excessive mandate of power. By that, 
the independence of the judiciary was severely undermined and the division of power 
dismantled. The parliament’s mandate was reduced to a ‘law factory’, which is missing 
inclusive and sufficient debates. The aggrandisement of the executive virtually abolished the 
division of power and the system of checks and balances.  
3.6. Changes regarding the effective power to rule in Hungary 
The dimension of effective power control measures the effective power to rule held by elected 
officials. The regime holds the state’s monopoly on the use of force throughout the country 
without meaningful competition. There are two small para-military groups; ‘The New 
Hungarian Guard’ with 200 members and the ‘Civil Guard Association for a Better Future’ with 
100-150 members. Both are aligned with the right-wing extremist Jobbik party as biggest 
opposition and provoke violent clashes against the Roma population (BTI 2016a: 5).  
As mentioned in chapter 3.2., all official members gained their power through a democratic 
election process and they occupy a sufficient scope of political action. Under the FIDESZ 
government, the state’s administration infrastructure and governmental administration have 
been centralised. Schools and hospitals are now run by the central government and not by local 
authorities. Kornai points out that this ‘obsessive’ centralisation is intertwined with nationalistic 
tendencies and the aim to spread the party’s ideology (Kornai 2015: 36). In 2013, the Hungarian 
government established a new supervisory institution for schools. According to their website, 
the ‘Klebelsberg Institution Maintenance Centre’ (Klebelsberg Intezmenyfenntarto Kozpont, 
KLIK) has “the aim of replacing uncertain local government funding to guarantee the stable 
operation of schools, orderly conditions for teaching and training, and the uninterrupted 
teaching of students” (Ministry of Human Capacities 2016). Yet, the institution supervises and 
controls all public schools in the country, including 120.000 teachers and thus is in charge of 
personnel and maintenance. Most significantly, the school’s curricula were subordinated to 
FIDESZ’ ideology (Vetter 2017b: 100; Kornai 2015: 45).  
The result is a monopolistic system of hierarchical power with evident centralization tendencies 
and pronounced executive domination (Lang 2015: 3). Therefore, the main obstacle to the 
principle of the effective power to rule is in fact an overpowered and aggrandised executive as 
illustrated in chapter 3.5. Nevertheless, no veto-powers like the military, business elites or 
 
 
44 
 
multinationals are inhibiting on the effective power to govern. In conclusion, the dimension of 
effective agenda control is intact. The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index rates the 
monopoly on the use of force, basic administration and the effective power to govern with 10 
(BTI 2016a: 5-7). 
3.6.1. Outlook: Changes regarding the effective power to rule in Poland 
The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index 2016 testifies, that the Polish government’s 
monopoly of power is not infringed upon by other forces and public order and security are fully 
guaranteed throughout Poland. The BTI rates the monopoly on the use of force in Poland with 
10. Since the report, no further competition on the monopoly has emerged and the effective 
power to govern lies in the hand of the executive. Yet, under the PiS government, the influence 
of the catholic church increased significantly. The BTI Poland 2016 did notice that the catholic 
church does possess some influence on social and educational issues (BTI 2016b: 6) but 
Krzemiński illustrates a more current view on the extent the catholic church and the PiS are 
interconnected. In Poland, the main branch of Catholicism and its Bishops support the PiS party. 
Pater Rydzyk, who is a prominent figure in the Polish-Catholic church, plays a central role in 
this reciprocal support scheme. Shortly after the election, the PiS government supplied Pater 
Rydzyk with millions of Zloty for his PiS-supportive, political campaigns through his numerous 
media outlets including radio stations, newspapers, TV channels and religious foundations 
(Krzemiński 2017a: 9). Most predominant is the radio station Radio Maryja, with Pater Rydzyk 
as its director. This station is one of the few media outlets available in rural areas (see chapter 
3.3.1.) (Krzemiński 2017b: 4). Not only do these media outlets openly support the governing 
party, but its religious preaching constitutes the ideological basis for the PiS party, its members 
and the state itself. The ideology is based on a national-catholic vision of Poland, as indicated 
in chapter 3.1. The national discourse enjoys absolute priority as does the good reputation of 
the nation. Therefore, freedom of speech and other civil rights are limited in order to protect 
the country’s reputation from national and international criticism. National minorities should 
only be included and enjoy civil rights when they are fully assimilated, which, in practice, is 
the identification with Catholicism (Krzemiński 2017b: 2). The main enemy to this ideal is 
liberalism, which Jews and the Polish nobility are constantly accused and blamed for, causing 
anti-Semitic elements to constantly appear in the discourse of Radio Maryja. Such anti-Semitic 
hostility is combined with hatred towards communism leading to the old pattern of ‘Jewish 
communism’. Nation and Catholicism strongly correlate and the church is seen as one of the 
greatest authorities for the preservation of the national spirit.  Hence, the church must protect 
national interest and the nation the interest of the church. Krzemiński argues, that Pater Rydzyk 
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and his organisations (especially the radio station Maryja) triggered a social movement that is 
to a significant extent responsible for the rise and victory of PiS (Krzemiński 201ab: 9-11). The 
official support by the church appeals to a large segment of the Polish society and is therefore 
used by PiS as an instrument to stabilise and increase its political support (Krzemiński 2017b: 
1). On July 9th, 2017, the 26th pilgrimage was celebrated with over 1000 participants, including 
several PiS politicians like the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Defence, the Minster of 
Internal Affairs and the Prime Minister Beata Szydło. During her speech, she highlighted and 
advocated the common values the government and Radio Maryja share, namely the compassion 
for the fatherland, the conservation of the Polish culture and the catholic church. She 
emphasised that Pater Rydzyk deserved great respect and gratitude (Polen-Analysen 2017c: 
14).  
In conclusion, the church holds significant power in Poland and influences the political 
decisions of the government. The church provides and helps fostering the ideology not only PiS 
but also the state is currently build upon. Whether the church holds a veto power cannot be 
determined since it’s unclear what would happen in a case of disagreement. However, according 
to Krzemiński, politicians who are especially close to Pater Rydzyk and are frequent guests at 
his radio station do enjoy, to some extent, immunity towards party-internal criticism 
(Krzemiński 2017a: 8). The monopoly of power is therefore to a some extent limited due to a 
somewhat lacking secularism. Nevertheless, the main problem, just like in Hungary but to a 
lesser extent, is the executive possessing too much power due to a disproportionate 
aggrandisement of the executive branch. The autonomy and the mandate of the Constitutional 
Court, the Judiciary, the Polish National Bank and the public media outlets were reduced and 
dismantled for the benefit of the executive (Vetter 2017a: 2).  
4. Conclusive categorisation  
The examination of Hungary’s and Poland’s performances within the five sub-regimes of an 
embedded democracy has been finalised. The next step will be to assess the respective 
performances in light of the requirements to an embedded, liberal democracy in accordance to 
Merkel. As illustrated, many aspects of an embedded democracy could not be fulfilled by both 
states and therefore a conclusive categorisation of what sub-type of defective democracy 
Hungary qualifies as, is in order. In light of this evaluation, I will formulate an outlook 
regarding Poland’s path away from democracy and debate what kind of assessment, in light of 
the brief legislative period of the PiS party, can already be made. 
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4.1. Hungary as a defective democracy 
The assessment of Hungary’s democracy revealed several shortcomings, malfunctions and 
misuses of aspects of an embedded democracy that can be summarised in three aspects. First, 
the dimension of vertical legitimacy is not fully intact. The government failed to guarantee a 
comprehensive and inclusive suffrage. The reforms addressing the electoral system initiated by 
the governing party strengthened the bias towards bigger parties, due to gerrymandering and a 
revised calculation process on how to translate votes into seats, to such a significant extend that 
the election of 2014 cannot be declared fair. The reforms encompass mechanisms that twist the 
will of the electorate into an extended number of seats in parliament for the majoritarian party 
(see chapter 3.2.). This is especially true in light of the excessive propagandistic use of public 
and private media outlets. The ‘fourth power of democracy’ was brought into line with the 
governing party and their ideology. Critical media outlets are rare and are forced to face a 
myriad of smear campaigns, structural discriminations and administrative, political and cultural 
barriers. The independent political sphere is severely weakened and subverted by party 
loyalists. Critical voices of individuals, groups and associations like CSOs, NGOs and religious 
groups are being restricted and interfered with to an alarming extend. 
Next to a restricted independent political sphere, I would argue that the ethnocultural 
understanding of the nation actively promoted by the current government and thus the entailed 
consequences constitute the second significant threat to an embedded democracy. The 
anchorage of an ethnocultural ideology begins in the preamble, which de jure possesses legal 
impact (see chapter 3.4.). The party promotes an ethno-cultural understanding of the Hungarian 
nation to such an extent that ethno-Hungarians living outside the country do belong to the 
Hungarian nation whereas minorities living in Hungary do not. Hence, all three branches of 
government aim to represent, enforce and protect the wellbeing of the Hungarian nation and 
not the wellbeing of the people, the demos. The country’s sovereign are not the citizens, or 
demos, as it is supposed to be in a democracy, but the nation. This entails the promotion of 
conservative values like family, tradition, the ‘völkisch’ movement, the homeland and the 
Christian faith (Küpper 2011: 138; Halmai 2011: 146; Lang 2015: 2; Vetter 2017b: 96). This 
understanding is underpinned with strong nationalistic rhetoric advocated and financially as 
well as institutionally supported by the governing party including its entire sphere of influence. 
Thus, the discourse in Hungary is shaped by racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic nationalistic 
beliefs causing structural discrimination towards minorities, culminating, for example, in 
school segregation of Roma. Civil rights predominantly apply to ethno-Hungarians and not to 
all Hungarian citizens.  
 
 
47 
 
The third, and most crucial, extensive and vital violation to an embedded democracy is the 
virtual, de facto and de jure abolishment of the division of power. An extensive executive 
aggrandisement significantly limited the power of the Constitutional Court and the Parliament. 
The Constitutional Court was perpetually deprived of almost all of it powers. The court can no 
longer review constitutional amendments for their constitutionality, it cannot sufficiently 
review the budget and the number of actors that can initiate a constitutional review was reduced 
to mostly FIDESZ-loyal individuals. The veto capacity of the Court is thereby reduced to an 
alarming extent. The level of independence of the Constitutional Tribunal is low since nine out 
of eleven judges were hand-picked by the executive and crucial supervision institutions are 
infiltrated with government supporters. The participation rights of the parliament are 
undermined since the process of legislation-making lies in the hand of FIDESZ politicians and 
legislation drafts are debated upon, passed and signed in an unprecedented pace. The high 
number of cardinal laws addressing social, cultural and economic policies manifest the 
governing party’s policies for an unknown period of time, since even if FIDESZ were to become 
an opposition party, the future government would still have troubles achieving a qualified 
majority to change these laws. Corruption assists the government by expanding the group of 
loyal supporters as well as by accumulating the wealth of the loyal governmental elite. FIDESZ 
was able to implement its loyalist into countless institutions, organisations, companies and 
media outlets. The loyalists will ensure to stop anything that might contradict FIDESZ’ 
interests. Thus, it has been assured that any other party will significantly struggle to overcome 
their position of power (Bánkuti/Halmai/Scheppele 2013: 145).  In conclusion, given the 
aspects two and three, the dimension of liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law is also 
severely damaged and cannot be considered intact. These conclusions are strong indicators for 
a defective democracy and, more precisely, an illiberal democracy with delegative tendencies 
as described in chapter 2.2. Hungary displays all three characteristics of an illiberal democracy, 
namely: The lack of enforcement of civil and political rights and freedoms, restricted 
functionality of the judiciary and systematic corruption within politics and administration. The 
strong political influence of the judiciary is a crucial factor in this assessment. Merkel points 
out that the politically motivated deformation of the judiciary, which is usually accompanied 
with a disempowered legislative, is the main aspect of a delegative democracy. The rule of law 
is being replaced by the rule of men through law. Leading political actors do not feel obligated 
to apply to constitutional norms but rather the norm and political aim they established 
themselves (Merkel 2003: 268-269). Thus, the diagnosis of an illiberal democracy with 
delegative tendencies is substantiated.  
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This approach towards governing is again a result of the party’s ideology. It is of their 
understanding that the election gave them the mandate to represent the whole nation, without 
considering the opposition and their voters, minorities or people who think differently. Consent 
and compromises do not exist in Orbán’s concept of democracy and the Constitutional Court 
and the parliament are just mere obstacles on their path towards a new Hungary. The executive, 
in their eyes, is the dominant branch of government and the other branches shall merely assist 
it (as indicated in chapter 3.1.). This phenomenon, which is commonly known as ‘tyranny of 
the majority’, is further reflected in the extensive centralisation of power towards the executive 
(Vetter 2017b: 96-97; Lang 2015: 3). Orbán advocated this type of governing even before his 
election as Prime Minister: During a speech held by Orbán in September 2009, he predicted 
that there was “a real chance that politics in Hungary will no longer be defined by a dualist 
power space […]. Instead, a large governing party will emerge in the centre of the political 
stage [that] will be able to formulate national polity, not through constant debate but through a 
natural representation of interests” (Bánkuti/Halmai/Scheppele 2012: 145). This approach 
towards governing is now firmly established into the country’s fundamental law.  
In conclusion, the aggrandisement of the executive based on ideological sentiments constitutes 
the most severe violation on an embedded democracy. As illustrated, the disempowerment and 
exploitation affecting the judiciary is not the only significant factor to this assessment. The 
massive degradation and disfranchisement of media outlets to propaganda machineries, the lack 
of civil-rights’ protection and enforcement and the extensive corruption constitute severe 
violations to the Hungarian democracy as well. That is why Hungary can be described as an 
illiberal democracy with delegative tendencies. However, this is not a process the Hungarian 
leaders would want to hide or a progress that is undesired by the leadership since Orbán himself 
openly declared that the transformation of the Hungarian state to an illiberal democracy was his 
primary goal (Vetter 2017b: 71).  
4.2. Poland’s aspirations towards a defective democracy 
Since the current legislative term of the PiS party, with less than two years, is quite young, I 
will abstain from declaring Poland a defective democracy. In their recent legislative term from 
2005 to 2007, Kaczyński as prime minister and his party pursued similar policies and polity 
changes like they do today. Yet, the coalition failed to last more than two years and the 
succeeding party was able to reverse the reforms enforced by the PiS government. For the time 
being, it remains to be seen for how long the PiS party will be able to hold onto power and 
whether the current and future reforms will be further cemented into the country’s institutional 
architecture.  
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However, the similarities between the approaches of both parties, PiS and FIDESZ, have been 
made evident and Kaczyński’s aspiration to build a Budapest in Warsaw indicates a strong will 
to further dismantle the Polish democracy and especially the division of power. The similarities 
are manifold, since, again, the democratic architecture faces three main obstacles, just like in 
Hungary. First, the independent political sphere of action has been disrupted, weakened and 
infiltrated with the party’s ideology. The public media sector reveals a strong bias towards the 
governing party. Although the private media sector remains reverse, it has to be noted that most 
Polish households receive only public television. Therefore, millions of Polish viewers only 
have access to the propagandistic news provided by the state. Civil society groups and NGOs 
face several obstacles like smear campaigns, raids and legal barriers. Both freedom of press and 
freedom of association are weakened and face several obstacles and the dimension of vertical 
legitimacy is damaged, yet to a lesser extent than in Hungary.  
Second, the ethno-nationalistic sentiments promoted by the government foster a sphere of 
hatred towards minorities and the state is not able (or possibly willing) to fully guarantee 
individual liberties from violations by private and public agents. The church occupies a crucial 
role in promoting such an ethno-nationalistic approach with strong catholic influence. The 
church assists the governing party in their aim to spread the ideology of a new Poland through 
numerous channels including popular media outlets. The prosperity and the wellbeing of the 
Polish nation is viewed as the greatest good and the reputation of Poland must be protected. 
This constitutes the basis for both internal as well as external politics. International cooperation, 
compromises and treaties are just seen as possible threats to Polish sovereignty. The 
nationalistic and conservative norms that are being promoted advocate the nation, family 
values, catholic faith, traditions and the Polish culture.  This results in the demand for a united, 
Polish nation with a uniform, catholic lifestyle and a common cultural and historic memory as 
shared identity. Rights of minorities should only then be protected and promoted when 
minorities fully assimilated themselves (as illustrated in chapter 3.1., this means assimilation to 
catholicism) (Buchloc/Komornik 2016: 85-87). As in Hungary, the sovereign in Poland are not 
the citizens, the demos, but ethno-Polish people, the nation. The nation is defined by common 
catholic faith, common conservative and traditional norms and a common history and culture. 
Minorities which do not belong to this entity do not belong to the nation and are not going to 
be represented by the Polish government (Buchloc/Komornik 2016: 85).  This understanding 
is, just like in Hungary, underpinned with strong nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-Semitic 
sentiments advocated by the governing political party, the church and their respective media 
outlets.  
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Third, the executive aggrandisement and the disempowerment of the judiciary: The three 
branches of government are no longer equal nor independent. The executive significantly 
enhanced its influence on the other two branches. The judiciary was brought in line with the 
government and the parliament was discredited to a law factory. The inflated mandate of power 
of the Minister of Justice demolishes the independence of the judiciary, including the 
Constitutional Court and Ordinary Courts. The division of power and the mechanism of checks 
and balances are no longer intact in Poland. 
Again, this approach is mirrored in the party’s ideology. As in Hungary, the tyranny of the 
majority is upheld as the best and most effective way of governance. The party is supposed to 
have received a mandate from the electorate to represent the whole nation. In their 
understanding, this mandate entails a non-compromising and rigorous approach towards 
governing. Checks and balances as well as the division of power constitute mere obstacles to 
the prosperity of the nation and therefore have to be subordinated to the executive 
(Buchloc/Komornik 2016: 86-87). In conclusion, Poland has and is taking similar steps in 
comparison to Hungary and thus Poland is on the fast-track to an illiberal democracy with 
delegative tendencies, following the example of the FIDESZ party. Łazowski diagnosed Poland 
with an “‘anti-democratic blitz’ […] drawn from an autocrat’s textbook [on] “how to dismantle 
democracy in 80 days”” (Łazowski 2016: 3) and several theorists see all of Kaczyński’s actions 
mirrored in those of Orbán (Łazowski 2016: 4; Sapper/Weichsel 2016: 4; Lang 2016). Thus, 
the governing party will continue following the path towards illiberal democracy as displayed 
by FIDESZ by further centralising the power towards the executive, especially by weakening 
local governments (Nations in Transit Poland 2017: 3). Poland will likely continue weakening 
the independent political sphere by targeting, harassing and discrediting NGOs. Furthermore, 
the governing party will assumedly dismantle the independence of private media outlets as well 
(Łazowski 2016: 4). For 2018, the Minister of Justice announced extensive structural reforms 
addressing the whole judiciary system and its personnel (Vetter 2017a: 3) which will most likely 
include at least parts of the vetoed bills. Furthermore, as illustrated during the assessment, the 
party has announced several reforms to come addressing the electoral regime, media outlets 
(big media package) and maybe even a referendum addressing the constitution (see chapters 
3.2.1., 3.3.1., 3.4.1).  
The systematic restructuring of important political, socio-political and cultural institutions as 
well as the political propaganda campaign generate the concern that the shift towards 
nationalistic and conservative values within the Polish population could be further enhanced, 
strengthened and cemented so that different or critical opinions in politics and civil society are 
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permanently marginalized and discredited (Vetter 2017b: 66). Nevertheless, the prognosis is 
less certain, in comparison to Hungary, since PiS is not as embedded into the political system 
as FIDESZ is and the upcoming elections are more likely to change existing majorities both to 
the advantage or disadvantage of PiS, in comparison to Hungary. The reforms addressing the 
country’s institutional architecture can be reversed more easily in Poland than in Hungary due 
to their reduced extent and significance as well as their recency. That is why Poland only 
displays strong tendencies towards an illiberal democracy with delegative tendencies.  
Nevertheless, the similarities between both parties as well as their strategies on system 
transformation are overwhelming: Their state-credo is to distance themselves from western 
liberalism and liberal democracy is a western-elite concept that was imposed onto Poland and 
Hungary. Both governing parties in Poland and Hungary anchor the perceived stagnation of 
their countries in the triad of liberalism, globalism and pluralism which were forcefully 
implanted within their countries’ regimes by western and European elites as well as ex-
communist insiders which settled down in several branches of the state after an opaque and 
allegedly unfair transformation process from communism to capitalism (see chapter 3.1.) 
(Bielik-Robson 2017: 90-91; Fehr 2016: 81-82; Koenen 2015: 40-41). Hence, the parties view 
pluralism, tolerance and compromises as indicators for a weak, liberal state. The liberal state as 
an elite, European project must be overcome to the benefit of a strong state dedicated to anti-
liberalism and anti-pluralism (Fehr: 2016: 82-83). Thus, as indicated in chapter 3.1., the similar 
ideologies and the concluding approaches towards governing do indeed lead to similar polity 
changes. The focus on the judiciary and the media as first and primary targets of both parties is 
evident as is their similar goal of an illiberal and centralised government with strong focus on 
ethno-nationalistic prosperity, conservative values and anti-liberal sentiments. Both advocate a 
nationalistic restructuring of the state and the society in which faith, patriotism, and the 
heroization of the respective country’s history play central roles. The ethnic Polish and 
Hungarian societies shall be unified under the umbrellas of strong nations with unilateral 
leaderships (Sapper/Weichsel 2016: 4; Lang 2016: 61-65; Fehr 2016: 80-82). In the next 
chapter, I will further scrutinise the strategy towards system transformation that has become 
evident in both Hungary and Poland. 
4.3. The executive aggrandisement in Hungary and Poland 
It has now become evident, that an executive aggrandisement is the common strategy pursued 
by both Hungary (Bermeo 2016: 12) and Poland in order to subordinate polity institution to the 
party’s aspirations. According to Bermeo, such an executive aggrandisement takes place when 
“elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one, undertaking a series of 
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institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge executive 
preferences. […] Such changes are usually framed as having resulted from democratic 
mandate.” (Bermeo 2016: 10-11). Bermeo portrays such an aggrandisement as one variety of a 
democratic backsliding towards autocracy. The primary targets of this strategy are the 
restriction of media freedoms as well as the judiciary’s independence and autonomy (Bermeo 
2016: 11). It goes without saying that popular approval is central for illiberal governments 
because changes in the electoral regime and within the judiciary do not guarantee a safe win 
during the next election. That is why sufficient influence and control over media outlets, as first 
part of an executive aggrandisement, is crucial to these regimes. The evident assertiveness of 
governmental influence on public media outlets is given and, as illustrated in chapters 3.3. and 
3.3.1., the influence on private media can be achieved through opportunities provided by the 
free market: Private media outlets can simply be bought by loyalists of the government. The 
control over the judiciary is the second aspect to an executive aggrandisement, since it serves 
the purpose of centralising the power towards the executive. Since both party’s de facto control 
the respective parliaments, the judiciary is the only branch of government that holds significant 
control over the executive. In order to pass controversial and possibly unconstitutional 
legislation that will favour the leading party’s interests, the judiciary, and especially the 
Constitutional Court, must be subordinated to the executive. Such an aggrandisement is usually 
pursued through the country’s constitution, either by implementing a new one, as happened in 
Hungary, or by issuing a referendum, as it has been announced in Poland (Bermeo 2016: 11).  
Today, democracies are less likely to be overthrown by open-ended coups d’état, as it was 
common during the Cold War years, or election day vote frauds. Rather, democracies face 
backsliding through more subtle ways, usually through the manipulation of democratic 
institutions themselves and under the umbrella of democratic legitimacy (Bermeo 2016: 7-8). 
Hence, de-democratization tends to be incremental rather that sudden and violent. Coups d’état 
are rarely successful and cause massive international attention8. Plain vote fraud on election 
day has declined due to the rise of international election monitoring9. The reason why the new 
form of de-democratisation is advocating more subtle and discrete ways is evident: A sudden 
shatter of democracy causes not only international attention but also triggers domestic protests 
and movements of resistance. Yet, changing certain mechanisms within the electoral regime 
through alterations in the allocation of votes, voter-registration and district boundaries seem to 
arcane and opaque to trigger any significant resistance. The disempowerment of the judiciary 
                                                 
8 See figure five in annex 
9 See figure six in annex 
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and media restrictions might be more evident threats towards democracy, but, as happened in 
Hungary and Poland, protests by affected journalists and judges can be counter-framed as 
special interest or as agents of an old and discredited world order, hence as communist elite. 
Critical voices coming from civil society organisations and NGOs can be discredited as agents 
of foreign interest, as it happened in Poland and Hungary. The fact that many NGOs are foreign-
funded only supports this claim and adds credibility to the regime (Bermeo 2016: 14). Extensive 
criticism from Brussels is being declared as foreign, liberal and pluralistic interests that threaten 
to undermine the country’s sovereignty. Hungary and Poland shall at no cost become a colony 
to Brussels and the so-called ‘orders’ coming from Brussels are being compared with pre-1989 
dictates from Moscow (Lang 2015: 5; Kornai 2015: 44). In conclusion, as proclaimed by 
Diamond, democratic breakdowns predominantly occur through subtle and incremental 
degradations of rights and procedures (Diamond 2015: 144; see chapter 1) because “piecemeal 
erosions of autonomy may thus provoke only fragment resistance” (Bermeo 2016: 14). Of 
course, it cannot be denied that the initiated reforms triggered protests and resistance in both 
Hungary and Poland whilst the extensive criticism coming from the European Union and its 
institutions supports and empowers the protesters. But despite these protests, both parties do 
enjoy very positive popularity ratings in several polls10.  
5. Already a lost case? – Conclusive remarks 
Given the assessment of the states of democracy in Hungary and Poland, one might question 
whether we can already speak of Hungary as a lost case with Poland closely behind. During the 
assessment of Hungary’s state of democracy, it became evident that FIDESZ installed 
numerous mechanisms to the country’s polity that sustainably cement the party’s influence on 
the government even if the party were to lose its majority in parliament. Countless party 
loyalists and party-friendly oligarchs are installed in key institutions like the Constitutional 
Court, the NMHH and its Media Council, the Hungarian National Bank, the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, the State Audit Office, the Monetary Council, the Competition Authority, the Central 
Statistical Office, etc (Bánkuti/Halmai/Scheppele 2013: 145). Schools and the school’s 
curriculums are supervised and determined by party affiliates. Moreover, FIDESZ loyalists 
control several private media outlets. The cardinal laws, which cemented the party’s social, 
economic and fiscal policies, are very difficult to revoke. Kornai stresses the fact that the 
                                                 
10 Two selected ratings are illustrated in the annex (figure seven and eight) and whilst their 
independence has been reviewed, it cannot be fully guaranteed. Yet, it has to be noted that the digits 
exposed in these ratings are mirrored in scientific literature (Lang 2015: 3; Vetter 2017b: 59, 100).   
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Hungarian transformation is not just a mere succession of isolated acts but rather “a strongly 
forged system, whose essential properties cannot be altered by partial modification” (Kornai 
2015: 41). A change of government has been made extremely difficult, especially in light of the 
biased electoral system and the wide-spread propaganda, which is praising the current system 
(Vetter 2017b: 96; Nations in Transit 2017: 3; BTI 2016a: 35; Kornai 2015: 47).  
Such a pessimistic prognosis calls for precise and effective intervention measures pursued by 
the European Union, especially in regard to Hungary. It is the first time that the European Union 
faces such an illiberal system transformation towards autocracy within its borders. Of course, 
there have been several right-wing radical parties, politicians, institutions and associations 
within the civil society which promoted similar ideologies. Yet, Hungary and Poland have 
rebuilt their whole political systems to bring it in accordance with their ideology. Such an 
extensive interference with basic, liberal principles of the rule of law is unprecedented. Hence, 
the EU ought to consider new strategies to successfully address this issue in order to prevent 
the rise of autocracies within its Union (Vetter 2017b: 174-175). As illustrated in this thesis, 
the European Union and its Commissions not only issued numerous opinions and 
recommendations on the reforms implemented in Hungary in Poland, the EU also initiated 
infringement procedures against both member states. While Poland and Hungary may have 
integrated some recommendations, they did not address the EU’s core concerns. The European 
Commission is keen on maintaining the dialogue with both countries yet there are two 
additional options available to the EU: First, the EU could use its ‘nuclear option’ and trigger 
Article 7 TEU. Article 711 is a mechanism aiming to respond to clear risks of a serious breach 
of a member state’s rule of law. They already openly declared to consider this option (see 
chapter 1) but the actual use of this option is highly unlikely, since sanctions, like revoked 
voting rights, require unanimity (excluding the affected member state). During an official 
meeting between Orbán and Kaczyński, it was assured to Kaczyński that the unanimity will not 
be reached due to Hungary’s veto (Vetter 2017b: 190). Both nations entered an alliance of 
convenience, unified in anti-liberal sovereignism (Lang 2016: 78). Second, the European Court 
could further initiate proceedings against both nations addressing the illegitimate legislations 
enforced by the governments. The effectiveness of such rulings is again limited: In September 
                                                 
11 This process can be initiated by the European Parliament, the Commission, the Council or by one third of the 
member states. The Council then engages into dialogues with the respective member state and may send 
recommendations and submit observations. The Council may then decide to implement sanctions and/or suspend 
certain rights, like the right to vote. At any time, the Council may decide to vary or revoke such measures (Lisbon-
treaty.org. 2013). 
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2015, the European Council adopted a decision declaring that in an emergency situation 
triggered by “a sudden inflow of national of third countries”, the Commission may adopt 
provisional measures (Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 2017). Hungary, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Romania voted against this resolution and Hungary and 
Slovakia requested the European Court of Justice to annul the decision. On September 9th, 2017, 
the Court rejected the claims that were officially supported by Poland and “dismisse[d] in their 
entirety the actions brought by Slovakia and Hungary” (Court of Justice of the European Union 
Press Release 2017). Hence, the decision of the European Commission, which for example 
obligates Hungary to take 1,294 refugees, is fully legal. Poland and Hungary, in contrast to 
Slovakia, declared this verdict appalling and commented that they will continue to refuse to 
accept refugees into their countries for security reasons (Polen-Analysen 2017d: 12; Kottoor 
2017). The Hungarian Foreign Minister dismissed the ruling as "outrageous and irresponsible" 
and as "a political ruling which rapes European law and European values" (Kottoor 2017).  
In conclusion, the most effective tool against a state’s breach of the rule of law cannot be applied 
against either Hungary or Poland because of the lack of unanimity and the rulings of the 
European Court are being ignored by both countries. The EU could have had a better chance at 
addressing Hungary’s illiberal term much earlier. However, since 2004, FIDESZ is part of the 
‘European People’s Party’ (EPP) which is holding the largest single bloc of seats in the 
European Parliament. Orbán is a prominent figure and has many allies in Brussels. Therefore, 
the reaction of the EU has been rather mild, due to this “almost perfect shield” (Rupnik 2012: 
136). Today, the EPP only has 25 seats more than the ‘Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats’ (S&D) and therefore needs to secure the 12 votes of FIDESZ. PiS on the other 
hand, is a member in the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) and does not 
enjoy such leverage (Gostyńska-Jakubowska 2016). Combined with the rather pessimistic 
prognosis regarding a domestic change of power in Hungary and the limited and rather 
ineffective options the EU has on protecting European norms and values in Hungary and 
Poland, theorists argue that an end of Hungary’s illiberal turn is not in sight as the situation is 
nearly irreversible (Koenen 2015: 44; Kornai 2015: 47; Vetter 2017b 176-177). Given this 
prognosis, it is appropriate to declare Hungary a lost case, at least for the near future. If all goes 
well for Kaczyński’s PiS party, Poland might just be right behind. 
 
 
 
56 
 
6. Sources 
Ágh, Attila/ Dieringer, Jürgen (2016): Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016. Bertelsmann 
Stiftung. Available at: http://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2016/country/SGI2016_Hungary.pdf 
(Last access: 25.08.2017).  
Amnesty International (2016): Public Statement: Poland: Counter-terrorism bill would give 
security service unchecked power. Available at: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur37/4263/2016/en/ (Last access: 26.09.2017).  
Amnesty International (2017a): Hungary: NGO law a vicious and calculated assault on civil 
society. Hungary: 13.06.2017. Available at: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/hungary-ngo-law-a-vicious-and-calculated-
assault-on-civil-society/ (Last access: 22.08.2017).  
Amnesty International (2017b): Poland: Rule of Law and Human Rights Concerns in Poland. 
Update, May 2017.  
Amnesty International (2017c): Poland: Three amendments that seriously undermine the 
independence of judiciary – July Update. Warsaw: 18.07.2017. Available at: 
https://www.amnesty.nl/actueel/poland-three-amendments-that-seriously-undermine-the-
independence-of-judiciary-july-update (Last access: 06.09.2017).  
Arak, Piotr/ Bobiński, Andrzej (2017): Poland. Nations in Transit 2017. Freedom House 
Reports. Available at:  https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/poland (Last 
access: 29.08.2017).  
Article 19/ Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (2017): Poland: Independence of public 
service media. January 2017. Country Report. Available at: 
https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38628/170208-PolandMediaA19HRHF.pdf 
(Last access: 30.08.2017).  
Bader, Katarina/ Zapart, Tomasz (2016): Polarisiert, politisiert und vielfältig. Polens Medien 
27 Jahre nach dem Systemwechsel. In: Osteuropa, 66 (1-2), 131-148.  
Bánkuti, Miklós/ Halmai, Gábor/ Scheppele, Kim Lane (2012): Disabling the Constitution. In: 
Journal of Democracy, 23 (3), 138-146.  
Bermeo, Nancy (2016): On Democratic Backsliding. In: Journal of Democracy, 27 (1), 5-19. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformations Index (BTI) (2016a): Hungary Country Report. 
Available at: https://www.bti-
 
 
57 
 
project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Hungary.pdf (Last 
access: 20.08.2017).  
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) (2016b): Poland Country Report. 
Available at: https://www.bti-
project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Poland.pdf (Last 
access: 29.08.2017).  
Bielik-Robson, Agata (2017): „Polnisches Weimar” oder die polnische Liberalismusallergie. 
In: Jahrbuch Polen 2017. Deutsches Polen Institut. Darmstadt: Harrassowitz Verlag Wiesbaden, 
89-97. 
Bozóki, Andreas (2011): Autoritäre Versuchung. Die Krise der ungarischen Demokratie. In: 
Osteuropa, 61 (12), 65-88. 
Bremmer, Ian (2017): Liberal democracy is eroding right in Europe’s backyard. In: Time 
Magazin, 190 (6). 
Bucholc, Marta/ Komornik, Maciej (2016): Die PiS und das Recht. Verfassungskrise und 
polnische Rechtskultur. Translated from Polish by Peter Oliver Loew. In: Osteuropa, 66 (1-2), 
79-94.  
Caramani, Daniele (2011): Comparative Politics. 2nd Edition. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) (2016): Media Pluralism Monitor 
2016 Monitoring Risks for Media Pluralism in the EU and Beyond Country Report: Hungary. 
Available at: 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/46799/Hungary_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed
=y (Last access: 22.08.2017). 
Chapman, Annabelle (2017): Pluralism Under Attack: The Assault on Press Freedom in Poland. 
Freedom House Report Poland. Available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_Poland_Report_Final_2017.pdf (Last access: 
30.08.2017).  
CIA Factbook (2017a): Hungary. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/hu.html (Last access: 08.08.2017). 
CIA Factbook (2017b): Poland. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/pl.html (Last access: 08.08.2017). 
 
 
58 
 
Council of Europe Experts (2012): Expertise by the Council of Europe Experts on Hungarian 
Media Legislation: Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules 
on Media Content and Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media. Available 
at: https://rm.coe.int/168048c26f (Last access: 20.08.2017). 
Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release (2017): The Court dismisses the actions 
brought by Slovakia and Hungary against the provisional mechanism for the mandatory 
relocation of asylum seekers. Luxembourg: 06.09.2017. Available at: 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-09/cp170091en.pdf (Last 
access: 16.09.2017).  
Croissant, Aurel/ Thiery, Peter (2001): Von defekten und anderen Demokratien. In: Welt 
Trends: Zeitschrift für internationale Politik und vergleichende Studien, 29 (1), 9-32. Available 
at: https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/opus4 
ubp/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/1082/file/29_sp_croissant_thiery.pdf (Last access: 
08.08.2017). 
Croissant, Aurel (2010): Analyse defekter Demokratien. In: Analyse demokratischer 
Regierungssysteme. Festschrift für Wolfgang Ismayr (edited by K. Schrenk und M. Soldner), 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 93-114. 
Diamond, Larry (2000): Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future? In: Journal of 
Democracy, 11 (4), 81-107. 
Diamond, Larry (2015): Facing Up to the Democratic Recession. In: Journal of Democracy, 26 
(1), 141-155. 
Die Zeit (2017): Wie gefährlich sind diese Männer für Europa, Herr Timmermans? In: Die Zeit 
at 4.05.2017. Available at: http://www.zeit.de/2017/19/polen-ungarn-eu-kommission-frans-
timmermans-viktor-orban-jaroslaw-kaczynski (Last access: 08.08.2017). 
Eriksson, Aleksandra (2016): Polish politicians try to defuse political crisis. In: euobserver.com 
at 19.12.2016. Available at: https://euobserver.com/political/136322 (Last access: 03.09.2017). 
Eriksson, Aleksandra (2017): Norway defends NGOs in Hungary and Poland. In: 
euobserver.com at 08.05.2017. Available at: https://euobserver.com/social/137818 (Last 
access: 03.09.2017).  
 
 
59 
 
European Commission Fact Sheet (2016): Opinion on the Rule of Law in Poland and the Rule 
of Law Framework: Questions & Answers. Brussels: 01.06.2016. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2017_en.htm (Last access: 02.09.2017).  
European Commission Press Release (2016): State aid: Commission finds Hungarian 
advertisement tax in breach of EU rules. Brussels: 04.11.2016. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3606_en.htm (Last access: 22.08.2017).  
European Commission Press Release Database (2016): May infringements’ package: key 
decisions. 5. Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality. Commission requests Hungary to put an 
end to the discrimination of Roma children in education. Brussels: 26.05.2016. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1823_en.htm (Last access: 23.08.2017).  
European Commission (2017): Commission Recommendation of 26.07.2017 regarding the rule 
of law in Poland complementary to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 
2017/146. Brussels: 26.07.2017. 
European Commission Press Release (2017a): Commission follows up on infringement 
procedure against Hungary concerning its asylum law. Brussels: 17.05.2017. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1285_en.htm (Last access: 09.08.2017). 
European Commission Press Release (2017b): European Commission acts to preserve the rule 
of law in Poland. Brussels: 26.07.2017. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
17-2161_en.htm (Last access: 09.08.2017). 
European Commission Press Release (2017c): European Commission launches infringement 
against Poland over measures affecting the judiciary. Brussels: 29.07.2017. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2205_en.htm (Last access: 08.08.2017).  
European Commission Press Release (2017d): INFRINGEMENTS - Hungary: Commission 
launches infringement procedure for law on foreign-funded NGOs. Brussels: 13.07.2017. 
Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1982_en.htm (Last access: 
09.08.2017). 
European Commission Press Release (2017e): Relocation: Commission moves to next stage in 
infringement procedures against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Brussels: 
26.07.2017. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2103_en.htm (Last 
access: 09.08.2017). 
 
 
60 
 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): Case of Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház 
and others v. Hungary. Judgement – Final. Strasbourg: 8.04.2014.  
Fehr, Helmut (2016): In geschlossener Gesellschaft. Ostmitteleuropa und die Rückkehr des 
Autoritären. In: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 61 (1), 77-83.  
Forum for Religious Freedom Europe (FOREF): Hungary: Two years after ruling by ECtHR 
Church Law Remains Unaltered. Warsaw: 27.09.2016. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/268711?download=true (Last access: 22.08.2017).  
Gall, Lydia (2016): Hungary’s Biggest Oppositional Daily Shut Down. In: 
humanrightswatch.org at 10.10.2016. Available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/10/hungarys-biggest-oppositional-daily-shut-down (Last 
access: 08.09.2017).  
Gostyńska-Jakubowska, Agata (2016): Why the commission is treating Poland more harshly 
than Hungary in its Rule of Law Review. London School of Economics: Centre for European 
Reform – Opinion Piece. Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/02/04/why-the-
commission-is-treating-poland-more-harshly-than-hungary-in-its-rule-of-law-review/#Author 
(Last access: 28.08.2017).  
Halmai, Gábor (2011): Hochproblematisch. Ungarns neues Grundgesetz. In: Osteuropa, 61 
(12), 145-156.  
Hegedüs, Dániel (2016): Hungary. Nations in Transit 2016. Freedom House Reports. Available 
at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NIT2016_Hungary_0.pdf (Last access: 
25.08.2017).  
Hegedüs, Dániel (2017): Hungary. Nations in Transit 2017. Freedom House Reports. Available 
at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NIT2017_Hungary.pdf (Last access: 
08.09.2017).  
Herman, Lise Esther (2016): Re-evaluating the post-communist success story: part elite loyalty, 
citizen mobilization and the erosion of Hungarian democracy. In: European Political Science 
Review, 8 (2), 251-284. 
Human Rights Council (2017): Compilation on Poland. Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. New York: United Nations. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2016): Human Rights Committee: 
Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Poland. New York: United Nations. 
 
 
61 
 
Available at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/P
OL/CO/7&Lang=En (Last access: 26.09.2017). 
International Justice Resource Center (2017): Despite Venice Commission Review, Hungary 
Passes Foreign-Funded NGO Law. California: 13.06.2017. Available at: 
http://www.ijrcenter.org/2017/06/13/after-venice-commission-review-hungary-to-revise-
foreign-funded-ngo-law/ (Last access: 22.08.2017).  
Jaggers, Keith/ Gurr, Ted (1995): Transitions to Democracy: Tracking the Third Wave with 
Polity III Indicators of Democracy and Autocracy. In: Journal of Democracy 7 (2), 3-14. 
Karl, Terry L (1995): The Hybrid Regimes of Central America. In: Journal of Democracy, 6 
(3), 72-86. 
Koenen, Krisztina (2015): Orbánismus in Ungarn. Ursprünge und Elemente der „illiberalen 
Demokratie“. In: Osteuropa, 65 (11-12), 33-44.  
Kornai, János (2015): Hungary’s U-Turn. Retreating from Democracy. In: Journal of 
Democracy, 26 (3), 34-48. 
Kottoor, Naveena (2017): Poland, Hungary refuse to budge after EU Cout ruling on migration. 
In: dpa-international at 06.09.2017. Available at: http://www.dpa-
international.com/topic/poland-hungary-refuse-budge-eu-court-ruling-migration-170906-99-
934399 (Last access: 16.09.2017).  
Krzemiński, Ireneusz (2017a): Kirche und Politik – eine gefährliche Allianz. Translated from 
Polish by Silke Plate. In: Polen-Analysen: Kirche und Politik – Blick »von innen« und »von 
außen«. Nr. 202, 8-11.  
Krzemiński, Ireneusz (2017b): Der Nationalkatholizismus und die Demokratie. Translated from 
Polish by Silke Plate. In: Polen-Analysen: Der Nationalkatholizismus und die Demokratie. Nr 
193, 2-7.  
Kublik, Agnieszka (2016): Auf Linie gebracht. Polens öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunk unter 
PiS-Kuratel. Translated from Polish by Jerzy Sobotta. In: Osteuropa, 66 (1-2), 153-159.  
Küpper, Herbert (2011): Mit Mängeln. Ungarns neues Grundgesetz. In: Osteuropa, 61 (12), 
135-144.  
Küpper, Herbert (2012a): Ungarns neues Grundgesetz von 2011 – Kein Grund zum Jubeln, aber 
auch nicht das Ende der Demokratie. In: Südosteuropa Mittelungen, 52 (3), 80-101. 
 
 
62 
 
Küpper, Herbert (2012b): Ungarns Verfassung vom 25. April 2011. Einführung, Übersetzung, 
Materialen. In: Studien des Instituts für Ostrecht München, Band 70. Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang.  
Lang, Kai-Olaf (2015): Ungarn: demokratischer Staatsumbau oder Autokratie? Innere 
Merkmale und außenpolitische Folgen des Systems Orban. Leibniz: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik (SWP). Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. Availabe at: 
http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/41929/ssoar-2015-lang-
Ungarn_demokratischer_Staatsumbau_oder_Autokratie.pdf?sequence=1 (Last access: 
10.09.2017).  
Lang, Kai-Olaf (2016): Zwischen Rückbesinnung und Erneuerung. Polens PiS und Ungarns 
Fidesz im Vergleich. In: Osteuropa, 66 (1-2), 61-78.  
Łączkowski, Wojciech (2016): Comments on the Current Developments Concerning the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal. Translation of the paper into English has been financed by the Minister 
of Science and Higher Education as part of agreement no. 541/P-DUN/2016. Translated by 
Tomasz Żebrowski. In: Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny I Socjologiczny (Journal of Law, 
Economics and Sociology), LXXVIII (1), 51-56. 
Łazowski, Adam (2017): Time to stop the Polish danse macabre. Brussels: Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS) – Commentary. Available at:   https://www.ceps.eu/publications/time-
stop-polish-danse-macabre (Last access: 29.08.2017).  
Linz, Juan J. (2000): Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes: Boulder, Colo. (u.a.): Lynne 
Rienner Publ.  
Lisbon-Treaty.org (2013): The Lisbon Treaty: Article 7. Available at: http://www.lisbon-
treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-1-common-
provisions/7-article-7.html (Last access: 10.08.2017).  
Majerczak, Julie/ Raemdonck, Dan Van/ Guibert, Dominique/ McGowan, Iverna/ Kazatchkine, 
Natasha/ Dam, Philippe (2017): Joint letter to the European Parliament to adopt a resolution on 
the situation in Hungary. In: rsf.org at 26.04.2017. Available at: 
https://rsf.org/en/campaigns/joint-letter-european-parliament-adopt-resolution-situation-
hungary (Last access: 08.09.2017).  
Merkel, Wolfgang/ Croissant, Aurel (2000): Formale Institutionen und informelle Regeln in 
illiberalen Demokratien. In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 41 (1), 3-33.  
 
 
63 
 
Merkel, Wolfgang/ Puhle, Hans-Jürgen/ Croissant, Aurel/ Eicher, Claudia/ Thiery, Peter 
(2003): Defekte Demokratie. Band 1: Theorie. Opladen: Leske und Budrich Verlag.  
Merkel, Wolfgang (2004): Embedded and Defective Democracies. In: Democratisation, 11 (5), 
33-58. 
Merkel, Wolfgang (2010): Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie 
der Transformationsforschung. 2., überarbeitete und erweitere Auflage. Wiesbaden: Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften.  
Machińska, Hanna (2017): Das polnische Justizwesen. In: Polen-Analysen: Die PiS und der 
demokratische Rechtsstaat. Nr. 204, 2-7. Available at: http://www.laender-
analysen.de/polen/pdf/PolenAnalysen204.pdf (Last access: 05.09.2017).  
Ministry of Human Capacities – Hungary (2016): Klebelsberg Institution Maintenance Centre 
receives new directorship. Budapest: 26.02.2016. Available at: 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-human-resources/news/klebelsberg-institution-
maintenance-centre-receives-new-directorship (Last access: 15.09.2017).  
Mohr, Miriam (2016): Die demokratische hinkt der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung hinterher. 
Universität Heidelberg Journal. Available at: http://www.uni-
heidelberg.de/studium/journal/2016/06/bti.html (Last access: 26.08.2017). 
National Election Office (2010): 2010 Parliamentary Elections. Results. Available at: 
http://www.valasztas.hu/en/parval2010/298/298_0_index.html (Last access: 19.98.2017). 
National Election Office (2014): Parliamentary Elections 2014: The composition of parliament. 
Available at: http://www.valasztas.hu//en/ogyv2014/416/416_0_index.html (Last access: 
19.08.2017).  
Nijakowski, Lech M. (2016): Die Politik des polnischen Staates gegenüber den nationalen und 
ethnischen Minderheiten. Translated from Polish by Jan Conrad. In: Polen-Analysen: 
Minderheiten in Polen. Nr. 177, 2-10.  
OSCE (2014): Hungary. Parliamentary Elections. 6. April 2014. OSCE/ ODIHR Limited 
Election Observation Mission. Final Report. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/hungary/121098?download=true (Last access: 
20.08.2017).  
OSCE/ Mijatović, Dunja (2015): OSCE media freedom representative urges Poland’s 
government to withdraw proposed changes to the selection of management in public service 
 
 
64 
 
broadcasters. Vienna: 30.12.2015. Available at: http://www.osce.org/fom/213391 (Last access: 
30.08.2017). 
OSCE (2017): Final Opinion on Draft Amendments to the Act on the National Council of the 
Judiciary and Certain Other Acts of Poland. Warsaw: 05.05.2017. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/315946?download=true (Last access: 06.09.2017). 
Pech, Laurent/ Steinbeis, Maximilian (2017): Der große Abriss. Wenn Polen seine unabhängige 
Justiz zerstört, wird auch die EU nicht mehr funktionieren. In: Die Zeit am 20.07.2017. 
Available at: http://www.zeit.de/2017/30/polen-justizrat-parlament-gesetz-eu-folgen (Last 
access: 03.08.2017).  
Polen-Analysen (2015): Chronik vom 17.11.2015 bis 30.11.2015. In: Polen-Analysen: Die neue 
PIS-Regierung – Erste Wegmarken. Nr. 173, 22-23, Available at: http://www.laender-
analysen.de/polen/pdf/PolenAnalysen173.pdf (Last access: 21.09.2017).  
Polen-Analysen (2016a): Chronik vom 01.03.2016 bis 14.03.2016. In: Polen-Analysen: Die 
polnische Flüchtlingsdebatte. Nr. 178, 12-13. Available at: http://www.laender-
analysen.de/polen/pdf/PolenAnalysen178.pdf (Last access: 06.09.2017).  
Polen-Analysen (2016b): Chronik vom 19.04.2016 bis 02.05.2016. In Polen-Analysen: 25 Jahe 
Partnerschaft II. Nr. 181, 16-17. Available at: http://www.laender-
analysen.de/polen/pdf/PolenAnalysen181.pdf (Last access: 06.09.2017).  
Polen-Analysen (2017a): Chronik vom 04.04.2017 bis 01.05.2017. In: Polen-Analysen: Das 
prorussische Narrativ in Polen. Nr. 199, 7-9. Available at: http://www.laender-
analysen.de/polen/pdf/PolenAnalysen199.pdf (Last access 06.09.2017). 
Polen-Analysen (2017c): Chronik vom 04.07.2017 bis 04.09.2017. In: Polen-Analysen: Die PiS 
und der demokratische Rechtsstaat. Nr. 204, 13-19. Available at: http://www.laender-
analysen.de/polen/pdf/PolenAnalysen204.pdf (Last access: 06.09.2017).  
Polen-Analysen (2017d): Chronik vom 05.09.2017 bis 18.09.2017. In: Polen-Analysen: Jugend 
und Politik. Nr. 205, 12-13. Available at: http://www.laender-
analysen.de/polen/pdf/PolenAnalysen205.pdf (Last access: 19.09.2017). 
Polish Press Agency (PAP) (2016): Introduction of key media law postponed - Minister 
Czabanski. In: pap.pl on 08.06.2016. Available at: http://www.pap.pl/en/news-
/news,538255,introduction-of-key-media-law-postponed---minister-czabanski.html (Last 
access: 29.08.2017).  
 
 
65 
 
Pech, Laurent/ Steinbeis, Maximilian (2017): Der große Abriss. Wenn Polen seine unabhängige 
Justiz zerstört, wird auch die EU nicht mehr funktionieren. In: Die Zeit at 20.06.2017. Available 
at: http://www.zeit.de/2017/30/polen-justizrat-parlament-gesetz-eu-folgen (Last access: 
08.08.2017). 
Renwick, Alan (2012): Im Interesse der Macht. Ungarns neues Wahlsystem. In: Osteuropa, 62 
(5), 3-18.  
Reporters Without Borders (2011): Hungary’s media law is unacceptable despite amendments. 
In: rsf.org on 08.03.2011. Available at: https://rsf.org/en/news/hungarys-media-law-
unacceptable-despite-amendments (Last access: 20.08.2017) 
Reporters Without Borders (2016): RSF calls for EU financial sanctions against Poland. In: 
rsf.org on 27.10.2016. Available at: https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-calls-eu-financial-sanctions-
against-poland?nl=ok (Last access: 29.08.2017).  
Reporters Without Borders (2017a): Hungary. Prime Minister and press baron. In: rsf.org. 
Available at: https://rsf.org/en/hungary (Last access: 08.09.2017).  
Reporters Without Borders (2017b): World Press Freedom Index 2017. Ranking. Available at: 
https://rsf.org/en/ranking# (Last access: 16.09.2017). 
Reuters (2017a): Hungary’s Orbán courts far-right voters ahead of 2018 vote. Budapest: 
30.06.2017. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-orban-farright-analysis-
idUSKBN19L244 (Last access: 23.08.2017). 
Reuters (2017b): Poland’s president signs disputed 2017 state budget into law. Warsaw: 
13.01.2017. Available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-poland-economy-budget/polands-
president-signs-disputed-2017-state-budget-into-law-idUKKBN14X1U6 (Last access: 
03.09.2017).  
Rüb, Friedbert W. (2001): Hybride Regime – Politikwissenschaftliches Chamäleon oder neuer 
Regimetypus? Begriffliche und konzeptionelle Überlegungen zum neuen Pessimismus in der 
Transitologie. In: Bendel, Petra/ Croissant, Aurel/ Rüb, Friedbert W. (Hrsg.): Zwischen 
Demokratie und Diktatur. Zur Konzeption und Empirie demokratischer Grauzonen. Opladen: 
Leske und Budrich Verlag. 
Rupnik, Jaques (2012): Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: How Things Went Wrong. In: Journal of 
Democracy, 23 (3), 132-137. 
Sapper, Manfred/ Weichsel, Volker (2016): Tiefe Spaltung. In: Osteuropa, 66 (1-2), 3-4.  
 
 
66 
 
Scheppele, Kim Lane (2015): Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution. In: 
Sonnevend, Pál/ Bogdandy, Armin von (Publisher): Constitutional Crisis in the European 
Constitutional Area. Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania. Oxford: Hart, 111-
124.  
Sólyom, László (2013): Ende der Gewaltenteilung. Zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes in 
Ungarn. Translated from Hungarian by Krisztina Koenen. In: Osteuropa, 63 (4), 5-12.  
Sonnevend, Pál/ Jakab, András/ Csink, Lóránt (2015): The Constitution as an Instrument of 
Everyday Party Politics. The Basic Law of Hungary. In: Sonnevend, Pál/ Bogdandy, Armin 
von (Publisher): Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area. Theory, Law and 
Politics in Hungary and Romania. Oxford: Hart, 33-109. 
Szuleka, Małgorzata/ Wolny, Marcin/ Szwed, Marcin (2016): The Constitutional Crisis in 
Poland 2015-2016. Warsaw: Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (HFHR). Available at: 
http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/HFHR_The-constitutional-crisis-in-Poland-
2015-2016.pdf (Last access: 02.09.2017).  
The Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2017): Timeline of Governmental Attacks Against 
Hungarian NGO Sphere. 22 February 2017. Available at: http://www.helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/Timeline_of_gov_attacks_against_HU_NGOs_22022017.pdf Last access: 
22.08.2017).  
Tóka, Gábor (2014): Constitutional Principles and Electoral Democracy in Hungary. In: Bos, 
Ellen/ Pócza, Kálmán: Constitution Building in Consolidated Democracies: A New Beginning 
or Decay of a Political System? Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 311-328.  
Tóth, Gabor Attila (2013): Macht statt Recht. Deformation des Verfassungssystems in Ungarn. 
In: Osteuropa, 63 (4), 21-28.  
Transparency International (2017a): Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Hungary. Available 
at: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table 
(Last access: 04.09.2017). 
Transparency International (2017b): Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Poland. Available at: 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table (Last 
access: 04.09.2017).  
Vásárhelyi, Mária (2011): Angriff auf die Pressefreiheit. Die Medienpolitik der FIDESZ-
Regierung. In: Osteuropa, 61 (12), 156-166.  
 
 
67 
 
Venice Commission (2011): Opinion on the New Constitution of Hungary. Strasbourg: 
20.06.2011. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2011)016-e 
(Last access: 24.08.2017). 
Venice Commission (2013): Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary. Strasbourg: 17.06.2013.  Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2013)012-e (Last 
access: 20.08.2017). 
Venice Commission (2016a): Poland. Opinion on the Act of 15 January 2016 Amending the 
Police Act and Certain Other Acts. Strasbourg: 13.06.2016. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)012-e 
(Last access: 26.09.2017).  
Venice Commission (2016b): Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal. Venice: 
14.10.2016. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD%282016%29026-e (Last access: 02.09.2017).  
Venice Commission (2016c): Opinion on the Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the 
Constitutional Tribunal of Poland. Venice: 11.03.2016. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)001-e 
(Last access: 02.09.2017). 
Venice Commission (2017): Hungary. Opinion on the Draft Law on the Transparency of the 
Organisations Receiving Support from Abroad. Strasbourg: 20.06.2017. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)015-e 
(Last access: 24.08.2017).  
Vetter, Reinhold (2016): Gezeitenwechsel. Polens Rechte erobern die ganze Macht. In: 
Osteuropa, 66 (1-2), 19-36.  
Vetter, Reinhold (2017a): Kaczyńskis PiS und die „Dekommunisierung”. 
Entprofessionalisierung durch Personalwechsel in Justiz, Diplomatie und Streitkräften. In: 
Polen-Analysen: PiS, die Dekommunisierung und Entprofessionalisierung. Nr. 200, 2-5. 
Available at: http://www.laender-analysen.de/polen/pdf/PolenAnalysen200.pdf (Last access: 
13.09.2017).  
 
 
68 
 
Vetter, Reinhold (2017b): Nationalismus im Osten Europas. Was Kaczyński und Orbán mit Le 
Pen und Wilders verbindet. Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag.  
Vetter, Reinhold (2017c): Die PiS und das Recht. In: Polen-Analysen: Die PiS und der 
demokratische Rechtsstaat. Nr. 204, 7-13. Available at: http://www.laender-
analysen.de/polen/pdf/PolenAnalysen204.pdf (Last access: 05.09.2017).  
Wiśniewska, Martyna (2016): Corruption Perceptions Index 2015: Poland has improved. In: 
deloitte.pl at 29.01.2016. Available at: http://forensic-blog.deloitte.pl/en/corruption-
perception-index-2015-poland-has-improved/ (Last access: 04.09.2017).  
Zeller, Judith (2013): Nichts ist so beständig… Die jüngsten Novellen des Grundgesetztes 
Ungarns im Kontext der Entscheidungen des Verfassungsgerichts. In: Osteuropa, 59 (3), 307-
325. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
7. Legislation 
Hungary: 
ACT CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules of Media Content. 
Consolidated version, effective from 1 August 2013. Provided by the NMHH. Available at: 
http://nmhh.hu/dokumentum/162262/smtv_110803_en_final.pdf (Last access: 22.08.2017). 
Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Communication. Consolidated version, as 
effective from 1 July 2015. Provided by the NMHH. Available at: 
http://nmhh.hu/dokumentum/106487/act_clxxx_on_media_services_and_mass_media.pdf 
(Last access: 22.08.2017). 
Act CCIII of 2011 On the Elections of Members of Parliament. Provided by the Hungarian 
National Election Office as German translation. Available at: 
http://www.valasztas.hu/de/ovi/681/681_1.html (Last access: 26.08.2017).   
Hungary’s Constitution of 2011 with Amendments through 2013. Provided by the Comparative 
Constitutions Project (University of Texas, Austin). Available at: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2013.pdf (Last access: 22.08.2017).  
Poland: 
Act of 30 December 2015 amending the Broadcasting Act. Provided by the Polish National 
Broadcasting Council (KRRIT). Available at: 
http://www.krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/Portals/0/angielska/Documents/tekst-ze-
strony_ustawa_en.pdf (Last access: 15.09.2017).  
Act of 10 June 2016 on Anti-terrorist Activities and on the Amendments to Other Acts. 
Provided by legislationline.org as unofficial, English translation. Available at: 
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/20031 (Last access: 26.09.2017).  
Act of 22 June 2016 on the National Media Council. Provided by the European Platform of 
Regulatory Authorities (Epra) as unofficial, English translation. Available at: https://epra3-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/2893/original/Ustawa%20o%20Radzie%20
Medi%C3%B3w%20Narodowych%20eng.pdf?1469116200 (Last access: 15.09.2017). 
Law of 22 December 2015 on Amending the Constitutional Tribunal Law. Provided by the 
Sejm. Available at: http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/proc8.nsf/ustawy/122_u.htm (Last access: 
15.09.2017).  
 
 
70 
 
8. List of figures 
Figure one: Comparison of election results of 2010 and 2014 parliamentary elections in 
Hungary. Korai (2015): Hungary’s U-Turn. Retreating from Democracy. In: Journal of 
Democracy, 26 (3), 34-48. 
Figure two: Hungary: Political Independence Area and exposed risks. Centre for Media 
Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) (2016): Media Pluralism Monitor 2016 Monitoring 
Risks for Media Pluralism in the EU and Beyond Country Report: Hungary. Available at: 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/46799/Hungary_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed
=y (Last access: 22.08.2017). 
Figure three: World Press Freedom Index Hungary – Scores and Ranking 2009 – 2017. 
(Reporters Without Borders (2017b): World Press Freedom Index. Rankings. Available at: 
https://rsf.org/en/ranking (Last access: 16.09.2017).  
Figure four: World Press Freedom Index Poland – Scores and Ranking 2014 – 2017 (Reporters 
Without Borders (2017b): World Press Freedom Index. Rankings. Available at: 
https://rsf.org/en/ranking (Last access: 16.09.2017).  
Figure five: Coup frequency in democracies, 1950 – 2014. Bermeo, Nancy (2016): On 
democratic backsliding. In: Journal of Democracy, 27 (1), 5-19. 
Figure six: Vote-fraud allegations by western monitors in post-1975 democracies, 1991 – 2012. 
Bermeo, Nancy (2016): On democratic backsliding. In: Journal of Democracy, 27 (1), 5-19. 
Figure seven: Support for parties among decided voters, July 2017. Századvég Foundation 
(2017): Recent Research Results. Availabe at: https://szazadveg.hu/en/homepage (Last access: 
14.09.2017). 
Figure eighth: Opinion poll: Who would you vote for in the next Sejm election? Pacewicz, Piotr 
(2017): PiS z 40 proc. najsilniejszy od wyborów. Opozycja najsłabsza. Zamach na sądy nie 
zaszkodził władzy. In: oko.press at 08.08.2017. Available at: https://oko.press/pis-40-proc-
najsilniejszy-wyborow-opozycja-najslabsza-zamach-sady-zaszkodzil-wladzy/ (Last access: 
14.09.2017).   
 
 
71 
 
9. Annex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure five: Coup frequency in democracies, 1950 – 2014 (Bermeo 2016: 7) 
Figure two: Hungary: Political Independence Area and exposed risks (CMPF 2016: 4) 
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Figure six: Vote-fraud allegations by western monitors in post-1975 democracies, 1991 – 2012 
(Bermeo 2016: 8) 
Figure seven: Support for parties among decided voters, July 2017 (Századvég Foundation 2017) 
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Figure eight: Opinion poll: Who would you vote for in the next Sejm election? (Pacewicz 2017) 
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Assessment of the ‘Law on the National Council for the Judiciary’ and certain other Laws and 
the ‘Law on the Supreme Court’ 
The European Commission considers both laws as a significant threat to the rule of law by 
undermining the judicial independence (European Commission 2017: 6). Since the future of the 
laws vetoed by President Duda is still unclear, I will give a short overview on the content of 
both laws. ‘The Law on the National Council for the Judiciary and certain other Laws’ was 
approved by Senate on July 15th and referred back to the Sejm on July 24th by President Duda. 
The National Council for the Judiciary (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa, KRS) is a constitutional 
organ which is supposed to supervise the independence of judges. The Council consists of 25 
members and 15 of them were previously elected by judges of the Supreme Court, Ordinary 
Courts, Administrative Courts and Military Courts. The amendment would have declared that 
these 15 members will be elected by the Sejm with a three-fifths majority and the terms of office 
of the current members are going to be terminated 30 days after the amendment comes into 
power. Furthermore, the amendment would have established two assemblies whereby the First 
Assembly would have consisted of 15 judges and the Second Assembly of ten members from 
the executive and the legislative. It has been the Council’s task to appoint new judges to courts. 
The amendment would have declared that such a decision would have required unanimity, 
which would have been hard to reach (Machińska 2017: 5-6). Furthermore, the parliament 
would have had the power to recall members of the KRS at any time (Vetter 2017c: 8). 
Therefore, the decision process would have been easy to block, resulting in the opportunity for 
the executive and/or the legislative to block unwanted decisions. Thus, the mandate of the KRS, 
which results from the constitution, would to a large extend be deprived by this legislation 
(Machińska 2017: 6). According to the OSCE, the “legislative and executive powers would be 
allowed to exercise decisive influence over the process of selecting judges. This would 
jeopardize the independence of a body whose main purpose is to guarantee judicial 
independence in Poland” (OSCE 2017: 4). 
The second vetoed bill, the ‘Law on the Supreme Court’ was approved by the Senate on July 
22nd and referred back to the Sejm on July 24th by President Duda. The ‘Law on the Supreme 
Court’ included an additional aggrandisement of the Minister of Justice’s mandate. The current 
composition of judges in the Supreme Court would have been dissolved and replaced with 
judges that would have been previously appointed by the parliament (Vetter 2017c: 8). The 
Supreme Court would have been deprived of its right to nullification. The minister would be in 
charge of appointing the Director of the Supreme Court and would have full discretion over the 
extension of mandates past the retirement age (Machińska 2017: 5). A disciplinary body, which 
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would have been operating under a severe influence of the Minister of Justice, would have been 
established. The minister then could have used this body as an instrument to control all judges 
in the country (Vetter 2017c: 8). Especially the new rules on disciplinary hearings would have 
had the potential to entail an aura of paralysation to judges and therefore would have violated 
the fundamental principle of independent judges and courts and thereby the Polish constitution. 
The European Commission points out that the “mere threat” of disciplinary proceedings can 
cause judges to feel pressured into following the position of the executive (European 
Commission 2017: 16-17). In conclusion, the possible extension of the Minister’s mandate 
would have further violated the principle of division of power, the independence of the judiciary 
as well as international standards (Machińska 2017: 5; Vetter 2017c: 8; European Commission 
2017: 18). 
 
